

CESAR CHAVEZ, MINUTEMAN ■ BIRKENSTOCKED BURKEANS

FEBRUARY 27, 2006

The American Conservative

They Vote We Lose?



COME HOME, DEMOCRATS

I enjoyed very much Bill Kauffman's article on George McGovern in the Jan. 30 edition. He provided a useful correction of the caricature of McGovern held by many conservatives (like me). In the end, however, the sad truth is—as Kauffman himself noted—no Democrat today would dare embrace the agrarianism, localism, and even isolationism reflected in some of McGovern's comments. The McGovern reflected in Kauffman's article understood real America and loved it. There is no one of significance in today's Democratic Party of whom the same can be said.

WILLIAM WILDER
Vienna, Va.

MY PAL PAT

These are strange times. I just read a brilliant, spot-on column by Pat Buchanan. "Might the Arabs Have A Point" is right on the mark and should be required reading for every American.

I've never seen a really large income I didn't want to redistribute, a tree I didn't want to hug, or a social problem I didn't want to throw a program at, but my people are not putting out honest analyses of foreign policy like this, and unless we get our foreign policy under control, none of us is going to get anything else that we want. No doubt we'll go back to glaring at each other once we defeat the neocons, but for today, Pat, you're my new best friend.

LIN BROADLEY
via e-mail

AUSSIE DIVERSITY

Brian Milakovsky is completely wrong about the December riots in Australia (Forum, Jan. 30). They were the result of local residents' frustration with years of anti-social and even criminal behavior by Muslim Lebanese men and the police force's inability or unwillingness to deal with the problem.

The men habitually harass Australian girls, calling them "Aussie sluts" for wearing bikinis though their grandmothers wore bikinis. They deliberately block out the sun as women tried to sunbathe. Ain't multiculturalism grand? Last December they attacked a beach lifesaver—unheard of in a country where surf lifesavers are a revered national institution. When a gang felled and kicked the man who tried to help the lifesaver, somebody called the police. But the police did nothing—though witnesses insisted they could identify the attackers and even provide the numberplate of the car they drove off in.

That official indifference is why thousands turned up at what began as a peaceful rally. Moreover, only a minority of the protesters actually participated in the biff, which was fuelled more by alcohol than racism.

So it's simply not true that "thousands of Australian youths rioted against the Muslim minority." The truth is that thousands of Australians of all ages turned out to protest against the Lebanese youths' appalling behavior, not their religion or ethnicity. The riot was disgraceful. But unlike the Lebanese participants, most of the Anglo-Australians involved have expressed remorse.

And what about the Lebanese racist revenge raid, Mr. Milakovsky? Heard about that? The night after the riot the Lebanese, armed with bars and bats, drove to Cronulla in a convoy of about 25 cars with hazard lights brazenly flashing. They systematically smashed the windscreens of every car in some streets. Once again the police had been notified but did nothing to stop the violence.

But there's a silver lining. Because Australians are thoroughly fed up with the media labeling them as racists for objecting to such intolerable behavior, maybe the nasty little adjective is losing

its meaning in the suburbs and consequently its punch in the wider culture. About bloody time.

ANTONIA FEITZ
*Rocky River, New South Wales
Australia*

SAM FRANCIS'S HEIR?

As a devoted conservative (and long-time admirer of Pat Buchanan), I was shocked by the lunatic ravings of Gary Brecher in what is supposed to pass for a review of *A War Like No Other* by Victor Davis Hanson?

Dr. Hanson's lifelong professional devotion to the agrarian ideal of Jeffersonian democracy, as a sixth-generation farmer and classical scholar, marks him as a true paleoconservative in the mode of the late Samuel Francis. *A War Like No Other* is not about Iraq, nor is it a neoconservative tract, any more than are Hanson's fine works. Perhaps Mr. Brecher couldn't trouble himself to get past the introduction, which admittedly contains a few contemporary references that an unsophisticated and biased reviewer might, with effort, twist into some species of neocon commentary.

Yes, Hanson has been a supporter of the war on terror (or, as he rightly sees it, a defensive war against radical Islam) as is many a good conservative. The wisdom of the Iraq project is certainly debatable, but as he and many might see it, if it takes the war in Iraq to get the real enemy in the open, so be it. Good Lord, gentlemen, I haven't been this offended since I took a look at MoveOn.org.

TOM D'ALESSANDRO
via e-mail

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[PRESIDENT]

THE STATE OF UTOPIA

The memorable moments of past Bush State of the Union addresses were his “axis of evil” and those 16 fraudulent words about Saddam’s supposed efforts to obtain yellowcake from Niger. If the 2006 speech is to be remembered, it will be for similar defiance and delusion.

Any silver lining derived from the relative paucity of spending initiatives—if only because Iraq and Katrina have drained the federal coffers. With few exceptions, the rest was strikingly unconservative.

Four times the president derided “isolationism,” twice “protectionism”—while contradictorily calling for a policy of energy independence. He denounced “claims that immigrants are somehow bad for the economy” and repeated his call for a guest-worker program.

Binding all was the grand fantasy that allows President Bush to persist in his belief that “we are winning.” “Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer,” he maintained. And with audacity that would have made Woodrow Wilson blush, he proclaimed of Syria, Burma, Zimbabwe, North Korea, and Iran that “the peace of this world require[s] their freedom.” (Particularly removed from reality was Bush’s assertion that bin Laden aimed to “seize power in Iraq and use it as a safe haven to launch attacks against America and the world.”)

His solution for routing terrorism remains utopian—“to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom and peaceful change.” (Tell it to Iraq.) And he still fails to weigh the impact of American actions on the Muslim world—“We’ve entered a great ideological conflict we did nothing to invite.”

Presidents are obliged annually to recite that the state of our union is strong. But with the country caught in

“THE EFFECT OF LIBERTY TO INDIVIDUALS IS THAT THEY MAY DO WHAT THEY PLEASE; WE OUGHT TO SEE WHAT IT WILL PLEASE THEM TO DO, BEFORE WE RISK CONGRATULATIONS...”

—EDMUND BURKE



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an open-ended war, our borders bleeding, the deficit mounting, and his approval rating at an historic low, Bush actually seems to believe his own rhetoric—which may be as troublesome as anything he said.

[WAR]

SWITCH HITTING

“On the sixth day of Hate Week, after the processions, the speeches, the shouting, the singing, the banners, the posters, the films, the waxworks, the rolling of drums and squealing of trumpets, the tramp of marching feet, the grinding of the caterpillars of tanks, the roar of massed planes, the booming of guns—after six days of this, when the great orgasm was quivering to its climax and the general hatred of Eurasia had boiled up into such delirium that if the crowd could have got their hands on the 2,000 Eurasian war-criminals who were to be publicly hanged on the last day of the proceedings, they would unquestionably have torn them to pieces—at just this moment it had been announced that Oceania was not after all at war with Eurasia. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. Eurasia was an ally.”

—George Orwell, 1984

Gareth Porter of Inter Press Service notes that the American ambassador to Baghdad has explicitly demanded that

the Shi’ites, who won the Iraqi elections, not be given control of the defense or interior ministries and has implicitly threatened to stop funding the Shi’ite police commando units that have heretofore been co-operating with the U.S. military against the Iraqi Sunni insurgents. Meanwhile, *Newsweek* reports that the U.S. Army has been engaging in high-level talks with the Sunni guerrillas. A military spokesman says, “The local insurgents have become part of the solution.”

It looks as if the administration, behind all the gaseous rhetoric about “freedom on the march,” may be gearing up for a stunning reversal of alliances—as preparation for putting Shi’ite Iran in its gun sights. How might news of a sudden switching of partners in Iraq and the beginning of a campaign against a “new” enemy there be broken to the Republican faithful? The Bush propaganda team has an exemplary literary model.

[POLITICS]

PC TRUMPS PEACE

How serious are Democrats about opposing the war? Not very, if their treatment of antiwar Iraq veteran Paul Hackett, a candidate for the Democratic Senate nomination in Ohio, is any indication. In response to a voter question

about illegal immigration, Hackett noted that the Bush administration “is willing to let illegals come in and take the jobs of Americans.” “Deport them?” asked one young liberal in the audience. “Yeah, if we can afford to,” Hackett replied.

This response was enough to send some of Hackett’s fellow Democrats running for the hills. A blogger at the popular liberal site Daily Kos accused the Ohioan of—horrors—channeling “the spirit of mid-’80s Buchananism.” David Sirota asked on The Huffington Post whether Hackett wanted to be “the Tom Tancredo of the Democratic Party.” A Toledo city councilman fretted that Hackett was “to the right of Pete Wilson” and he might have to reconsider his support.

These Democrats are apparently willing to abandon a candidate whose anti-war message resonates among red voters—he took 48 percent in a solidly Republican House district—because he has the audacity to believe our borders mean something. Hackett isn’t backing down. “Illegal immigration is illegal,” he told the *Toledo Blade*. “It’s that simple.” Not that simple to everyone, it seems.

[ESPIONAGE]

SHARE A CELL WITH SCOOTER?

Late last month, Pentagon analyst Larry Franklin was sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison for passing classified information about Iran to two employees of AIPAC, Israel’s chief lobbying group in Washington, and also for sharing U.S. secrets with an Israeli diplomat. Franklin, 59, won’t begin his sentence until after he testifies against the two AIPAC employees, whose trial is scheduled for April.

The news—a key development in an area where America’s Iran policy and the always significant and often bellicose Israel lobby intersect—would seem significant by any standard. Yet as one veteran Washington editor told us

with astonishment, it wasn’t even mentioned in the *New York Times*. A Nexis search proved him correct.

The trial should be fascinating: Israel has been urging Washington to see Iran from its perspective for years and has the capital’s most formidable lobby working overtime to ensure that its wishes are well attended to. Seldom is there much push back, but the actual passing of classified information to Israel is still considered a no-no, as Jonathan Pollard would surely attest.

[CULTURE]

HATE CUISINE

France is feted for its cuisine, but its newest residents haven’t acquired a taste for the traditional fare being ladeled out on street corners and in train stations. Pork soup seems as innocent as it is savory—especially to homeless Parisians—but this is no clear broth. France is now home to five million Muslims for whom pork is forbidden—something not lost on the activists who call their recipe “identity soup.”

“Racial hatred” is a crime in France, though the cooks avoid the charge by freely offering food to all comers. Still, pork soup has been banned in Strasbourg—“Schemes with racial subtexts must be denounced,” said a statement by the mayor—and when volunteers admitted that they were serving pork, they were ordered out of Paris’s Montparnasse station. Now, according to the AP, “A leading anti-racism group has urged Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy to ban pork soup giveaways throughout France.”

Therein lies the problem: the antagonistic nature of the imported culture. Assimilation wouldn’t require all to munch pork happily together, but a commitment to peaceful coexistence wouldn’t demand that the charity stop. Those truly on their way to becoming Frenchmen would sooner scoff at the season- ing than issue a *fatwa* on soup. ■

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The American Conservative, Vol. 5, No. 4, February 27, 2006 (ISSN 1540-966X). Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off. TAC is published 24 times per year, biweekly (except for January and August) for \$49.97 per year by The American Conservative, LLC, 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA, 22209. Periodicals postage paid at Arlington, VA, and additional mailing offices. Printed in the United States of America. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 9030, Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030.

Subscription rates: \$49.97 per year (24 issues) in the U.S., \$54.97 in Canada (U.S. funds), and \$69.97 other foreign (U.S. funds). Back issues: \$6.00 (prepaid) per copy in USA, \$7.00 in Canada (U.S. funds).

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This issue went to press on February 2, 2006.
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Après Alan, Le Deluge?

He had presided over the greatest prosperity in U.S. history when Calvin Coolidge announced from the Black Hills of South Dakota, “I do not choose to run for president in 1928.”

In March 1929, Coolidge turned the presidency over to Herbert Hoover, the commerce secretary he derided as “The Wonder Boy.” Six months later came the Wall Street crash and Great Depression with which Hoover’s name is forever associated.

Coolidge was enjoying retirement.

Is Alan Greenspan the Calvin Coolidge of our time? Is Ben Bernanke, his successor as chairman of the Federal Reserve, fated to inherit a monetary crisis that Greenspan’s policies have assured? So some pessimists believe.

At his retirement after 18 years, Greenspan is being hailed as the greatest central banker of his time. He saw us through the crash of ’87, the fears of Y2K, the stock market collapse of 2000-2002. Only two recessions, neither deep, marred a tenure that coincided with two of the most prosperous decades in U.S. history.

Why, then, is the praise for Alan Greenspan not universal?

Dissenters say our prosperity is hollow. While the economy appears healthy, a disease is eating away inside, a disease that Dr. Greenspan has been treating with oxycontin. The chairman, they say, was a friend to presidents and kept them happy and himself in power by the greatest expansion of money and credit in history. And just as the easy-money Fed policies of the Hoover-Coolidge era led to the crash of ’29, a day of reckoning is ahead.

“If Greenspan is popular,” writes John Cassidy of *The New Yorker*, “it is because he has made many middle-class

home-owners millionaires, at least on paper.”

“But the economy is chronically unbalanced. Like an athlete on steroids, it is ailing from the inside. The United States has a negative personal savings rate; an immense budget shortfall, which will expand as the baby boomers retire; a trade deficit greater than Russia’s gross domestic product. As a country we are living far beyond our means. Every working day, we borrow more than three billion dollars from foreigners, notably the central banks of China and other Asian nations, in order to pay our import bills and keep our interest rates low.”

On its cover, *The Economist* portrays Greenspan as a desperate relay runner racing to hand the baton to Bernanke. Only the baton is a lighted stick of dynamite. The magazine contends that Greenspan is “leaving behind the biggest economic imbalances in American history.” Among the worst of these imbalances is a trade deficit that will come in at \$760 billion, or 6 percent of GDP. Some \$200 billion of that trade deficit is with China alone.

How do we pay for all those foreign goods? Through what one economist calls “vendor financing.” Writes Cassidy, “The Chinese lend us cash; we buy their goods”—like the college kid whose binge drinking is put on a tab by his bartender until the terrible settling of accounts at the end of the term.

As Chinese goods come to us, our technology, factories, and industrial jobs go to them. As China talks of

exporting a \$10,000 sedan to the United States, Ford joins GM in slashing 30,000 jobs, as the last two great American automakers, loaded down with “legacy costs” from the health and pensions plans of the great years gone by, fight to keep their creditors away from the door.

Gold has doubled in price under Bush to \$550 an ounce, a sign of sinking confidence in a currency. In late January, the Commerce Department reported the U.S. savings rate had fallen to the lowest levels since 1932 and 1933, the last years of Hoover, when folks had to spend their savings to survive. In the fourth quarter of 2005, U.S. consumers did not save a dime. They spent all they earned and more. Household debt, corporate debt, foreign debt are at records.

A primary source of consumer cash has come from refinancing homes. But the seemingly inexorable rise in housing prices has now stalled. A glut is appearing in some housing markets. That reliable source of spendable cash could dry up.

While the nation’s economic growth was 3.5 percent last year, that was below the best year of the Bush recovery, 2004, when growth reached 4.2 percent. More ominously, in the fourth quarter of 2005, U.S. economic growth fell to 1.2 percent, the worst quarter since 2002, before the recovery began. If we are approaching the end of boom times on borrowed money, Ben Bernanke may be left holding the bag.

More likely, our media elites will, as they did to the hapless Hoover, lay it all at the door of the White House. If the economy is going into the dumpster, George W. Bush will take the hit in the history books—while his party takes the hit this November. ■

[be careful what you wish for]

Democracy & Its Discontents

Voting doesn't produce peace—much less desirable outcomes—in societies that lack the foundations of a liberal order.

By Leon Hadar

AS THE NAZIS were about to capture power in the aftermath of the last democratic parliamentary elections in Germany in March 1933, there was no indication that the German Communist Party was mounting any concerted response, reflecting the belief among its leaders that the new Nazi-dominated government was the “dying gasp of moribund capitalism” and that Hitler’s government would create the conditions for a “revolutionary upturn” and accelerate the momentum toward a proletarian revolution. The expectation that the Nazis would help ignite a Communist revolution made sense at that time, if one was a Marxist believing in a doctrine that assumed that realities were predetermined by political and economic forces—that sooner or later the Good Guys were bound to defeat the reactionary capitalists and their agent, Hitler. Progress was on the march. The rest was just details.

Just details like the electoral victory of the radical Shi’ites in Iraq, or the win by Hamas in the Palestinian elections, or the strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Freedom is on the march in the Middle East according to the proponents of the grand ideological doctrine known as Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which has been the driving force behind the U.S. war in Iraq and the push for democracy in the broader Middle East. And around the globe: just

choose the color of your revolution. Suck up to those in Washington in charge of distributing funds for democracy promotion and choreograph a colorful media event displaying a lot of cool stuff. If that doesn’t work, dispatch a sleazy Chalabi-like operator to Washington and hire some lobbyists, and before you know it the Marines will “liberate” your country. You then become part of the larger story of a war of liberation *à la* Iraq, where a brutal dictator was unseated so that democracy could be installed as a model for the entire Middle East. Forget that the Iraqis didn’t greet their liberators with flowers. Forget those missing weapons of mass destruction and the more than 2,000 fallen Americans and who knows how many dead Iraqis. Just fix your eyes on the Democratic Peace Prize.

Indeed, Communism may be dead, but in Washington devotion to a grand ideological doctrine remains as powerful as ever. If you listened only to George W. Bush’s many let’s-make-the-world-safe-for-democracy sermons you would have to conclude that a historic “revolutionary upturn” has taken place in Iraq that will be accelerating the tempo toward a democratic revolution in the Arab world. For Bush, who apparently keeps Nathan Sharansky’s *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* next to his bed, democracy is the cure for most

of humanity’s ills, ranging from political violence and economic underdevelopment to male baldness. Even in its more modest version, the global democratic crusade adopts what the neocons consider to be an axiom of international relations—that democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against one another. Translating that maxim into policy means that Washington has the obligation, based not only on moral considerations but also on pure self-interest, to promote democracy worldwide as the most effective way to establish international peace and stability. In his second inaugural address, Bush proclaimed, “the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.” Democracy would not only respond to the legitimate demands of those living under authoritarian systems but also reduce the chances for domestic instability and international wars and retard the spread of terrorism. Not surprisingly, a huge complex of government agencies have become instruments for democracy promotion, with Republicans and Democrats alike subscribing to the catchy slogan “Make Democracy, Not War.”

If you dare to challenge the need to treat democracy promotion as a core national interest, members of the foreign-policy community will treat you as a

cynical Machiavellian who just doesn't get it. After posting on my blog a critique of the Democratic Peace Theory, a political-science professor wrote, "It's like studying world geography, and despite Columbus and Magellan and Drake and modern cartography and trips into space and satellite photography, they are still using maps without the Americas, but instead a big vast emptiness between Europe and Asia. You can't do science this way!" From this perspective, DPT, like Marxism, acquires the characteristics of a hard science whose mysteries only qualified experts can explore.

Friedrich Hayek, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, warned of what he called "scientism"—the imitation in the social sciences of the methods of the physical sciences. And as a political scientist, I'm very skeptical about the notion that DPT is a field of scientific inquiry. Indeed, the intellectual graveyards of the 20th century are packed with dead social-science theories that were overrun by events, ranging from Marxism and eugenics to convergence and interdependence, not to mention the numerous scientific theories that had given birth to America's bankrupted welfare programs. At the end of the day, it's the real world where social

science is tested, and when it comes to DPT, the Middle East has become a laboratory with Iraq serving as a test tube for the experiment. And it's a test that seems to be failing.

Foreign-policy analyst Fareed Zakaria argues that free elections taking place in societies that lack the foundations of liberal political culture—which includes all of the Middle East—tend to

rise to illiberal regimes and makes the region safe not for liberal democracy but for nationalism and other combative forms of identity. Hence the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the free elections helped to consolidate the power of the leaders of Shi'ite and the Kurdish separatists. Similarly, the celebrated Cedar Revolution in Lebanon was just another round in the competition between the

NEOCONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY IS BURSTING WITH SELF-CONTRADICTION. IT URGES WASHINGTON TO ESTABLISH A HEGEMONIC POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHILE IT CALLS FOR FREE ELECTIONS THAT EMPOWER FORCES OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN HEGEMON.

produce non-peaceful "illiberal democracies." Similarly, in a new book, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder pull the intellectual rug from under the rationale presented by the Bush administration for what it's doing in Middle East, arguing that states in the early phases of democratic transition or "emerging democracies" that tend to have weak political institutions, such as a free judiciary or press, are actually more likely than other states to become involved in war. And international-relations experts point out that authoritarian governments were responsible for maintaining relative peace in Europe in most of the 19th century.

But one doesn't need to apply complex theoretical models to figure out that the main cause of wars in the modern age has been nationalism and that its most powerful ally has been democracy, which empowers people to rally behind their national ethnicity, religion, and tribe and helps drive political figures who thrive during times of civil wars and wars between nation-states. When it comes to the Middle East, a process that challenges the current authoritarian regimes and permits free elections gives

many religious sects and their warlords. Moreover, the rise of Hamas in Palestine and the potential for the strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Islamist movements in other Arab countries reflect the bankruptcy of secular Arab nationalism. What is not clear is why Washington should force Arab countries to hold elections that will bring to power anti-American regimes.

In a way, neoconservative foreign policy is bursting with explosive self-contradiction. It urges Washington to use its military power to establish a hegemonic position in the Middle East, while at the same time it calls for holding free elections that empower forces opposed to the American hegemon and its allies. In Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia, free voting has resulted in the election of political parties that are less than enthusiastic about American's goals. That free elections in the Middle East region, where hostility towards the United States is reaching the stratosphere, would bring to power illiberal and anti-American forces shouldn't surprise anyone.

As they confront realities that repeatedly defy their rosy scenarios, the democratic crusaders are sounding more and



more like the Marxists of Germany in the '30s. They are always ready with a spin that transforms what looks like a worst case into an historic success. So the Shi'ites are in the process of establishing a theocracy in southern Iraq, the Kurdish nationalists in the north are preparing to secede, the Sunnis are turning their areas into havens for Osama's jihadists, and the whole of Mesopotamia may be on the verge of a civil war? Have faith in America's values and be idealistic about our vision. According to Bush, Iraq's struggles to forge a "democratic future" are comparable to the troubles the United States had while establishing its own constitutional government. Speaking from Philadelphia last December, Bush aimed to invoke the image of America's own Founding Fathers in support of Iraq's new political leaders. He didn't go as far as comparing Grand Ayatollah Sistani to Thomas Jefferson—but did come close. "Our Founders faced many difficult challenges. They learned from their mistakes and adjusted their approach," Bush said.

When Palestinian and Israeli officials frantically lobbied in Washington for the postponement of the parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza, noting that polls pointed to a possible victory by Hamas, America's top democracy cheerleader, Condoleezza Rice, was dismissive of those Middle Eastern naysayers. "Holding free and fair Palestinian Legislative Council elections on January 25 represents a key step in the process of building a peaceful, democratic Palestinian state," Rice said in a Jan. 11 statement. "Development of a Palestinian democracy based on tolerance and liberty is a key element of the Roadmap," she insisted. You have to believe that if you build a democracy, they will come. And on Jan. 25, Hamas came. ■

Leon Hadar is a Cato Institute research fellow and author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East.

Who Elected Hamas?

We did—with help from the Israelis and Fatah.

By M.J. Rosenberg

THE NIXON-CHINA analogy is growing stale. Every time an extremist takes power anywhere, the starry-eyed immediately trot out the "but it took Richard Nixon to go to China" example as evidence that the newest ideologue to win an election will pull a 180 once he's in office.

Using this logic, Hamas, now that it has been elected to lead the Palestinian legislature, is in a position both to make peace with Israel and to make it stick, something the more moderate Fatah could not do.

Unfortunately, the Nixon analogy probably doesn't apply here. Nixon was a pragmatist, not an extremist. Nor was his opposition to recognition of the People's Republic of China the centerpiece of his worldview. He did recognize China but only because he wanted to. At this point, there is no evidence whatsoever that the leaders of Hamas—in contrast to many of the people who voted for them—want normal relations with Israel. That does not mean they won't move toward a policy of peaceful coexistence, but if they do, it will not be by choice but because Hamas feels compelled by outside pressure or, more likely, internal necessity.

The bottom line is that there are very few silver linings in the Hamas victory. Striking, however, is the success of the election itself. International observers, led by the U.S. National Democratic Institute, deemed the election "free and fair." In its report following the election, NDI stated, "through the high turnout in these elections and in the 2005 Presiden-

tial election, as well as the notable participation in five rounds of municipal elections in the last year, Palestinians have clearly demonstrated a commitment to democratic elections." So much for the canard that Arabs are somehow inherently resistant to free voting.

On the other hand, the election results may put the lie to the Bush administration's view that democratic elections are, by definition, a good thing. Hamas, an organization best known for blowing up civilian buses, won fair and square, suggesting that sometimes elections, in and of themselves, can be problematic—especially if parties competing in them are not required to foreswear violence.

The other silver lining—one that still remains to be tested—is that Hamas can restore order to the West Bank and Gaza. The Bush administration and the Israelis have both repeatedly demanded that the Palestinian Authority dismantle the independent militias and confiscate their arms. That is likely to happen now, but it is not Hamas's arms that will be confiscated as the Americans and Israelis demanded. They will instead be the confiscators.

So how did this happen? Even Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claims not to know, saying that her analysts somehow dropped the ball by not predicting the Hamas victory.

The fact is that it was eminently predictable and perhaps even inevitable in the sense that the actions of Fatah, the Americans, and the Israelis made it so.

First, Fatah. The Palestinians were tired of Fatah's corruption and cronyism.

Foreign aid was siphoned off into the pockets of warlords and political hacks. Government payrolls were packed with Fatah loyalists who not only did nothing but were expected to do nothing. With its reputation for incorruptibility and its efficiency in providing social services, Hamas was a natural alternative despite its commitment to Islamic fundamentalism—not especially popular in mostly secular Palestine. Voting for Hamas was simply a way to vote “no” to Fatah.

Second, the United States. Perhaps Palestinians would have forgiven Fatah’s sleaziness if it had eased the burden of the Israeli occupation. Palestinians thought that the death of Yasir Arafat and the election of Mahmoud Abbas a year ago would lead the United States to push Israel to ease up on them. It didn’t happen. The Bush administration said the right things but, with the notable and significant exceptions of successfully

the PLO. Prior to Yitzhak Rabin’s election in 1992 and the Oslo agreement, successive Likud governments preferred any alternative to Arafat and his organization, largely because they were not interested in negotiating with the Palestinians at all and the Islamicists—unlike the PLO—were not interested in negotiating with them either. But their biggest contribution to the Hamas victory was more recent. After boycotting Yasir Arafat since his election in 2001, it was assumed that the Sharon government would be more forthcoming with his moderate and democratically elected successor who, after all, ended the *intifada*. It wasn’t. Sharon refused to negotiate with Abbas and simply ignored Israel’s responsibilities under the roadmap (freezing settlement expansion, for one). Other than calling Abbas a “partner,” Sharon treated him no differently than Arafat, and the Americans

Palestinians cite as being a major source of their misery. That was last year. This year, an election year, should see even more examples of the kind of pandering that only makes a bad situation worse.

But the Bush administration is not running for anything in 2006 and, as a second-term president, George W. Bush need not succumb to political pressure. That means he should give far more weight to what Hamas does and less to what it says. The Israelis, most notably Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz, say that Hamas has behaved “responsibly” since the election. In fact, Hamas has clamped down on terrorism against Israelis since the Palestinian ceasefire was agreed to last January.

The administration’s primary goal should be to encourage Hamas, using all the means at its disposal, to maintain the ceasefire. Both because of our commitment to the security of Israel and our opposition to the use of terrorism, the United States cannot be expected to deal with a Hamas that either perpetrates or supports terror. At the same time, we do not want to come down so hard on Hamas—by cutting off all aid to the Palestinian people, for instance—that we push them into an even tighter embrace by Iran and Syria. People in Israel or the United States who argue for policies that would increase Palestinian suffering as a means of paying them back for voting Hamas will only make terrorism, and a renewed *intifada*, not only possible but likely.

If played right, it is possible—although just barely—that the Hamas takeover will not be deleterious to U.S. interests or to Israel’s either. At this point, the president’s “wait and see” approach is exactly right. ■

M.J. Rosenberg is Director of the Israel Policy Forum’s Washington office and former editor of AIPAC’s Near East Report.

LAST YEAR, AFTER THE PRESIDENT OFFERED THE PALESTINIANS \$200 MILLION IN AID, CONGRESS TOOK \$50 MILLION OUT OF THAT PACKAGE AND GAVE IT TO ISRAEL.

getting the route of the separation barrier altered to ease Palestinian movement and the Gaza border crossings agreement, the U.S. pretty much let Prime Minister Sharon do whatever he wanted. Rightly supporting Sharon’s Gaza withdrawal, we couldn’t even get Sharon to negotiate its terms with Abbas. He insisted that Israel would do it without consulting the Palestinians. Accordingly, Abbas and Fatah got no credit for Gaza withdrawal while Hamas was credited for producing the unilateral pullout by force of its arms.

Third, the Israelis. They are the last people who should be surprised by the Hamas victory. In fact, in the 1980s Hamas—and previous incarnations of Islamic resistance—were quietly supported by the Israelis as alternatives to

didn’t press him. He ended violence and got almost nothing in return. To Palestinians, Abbas looked like a dupe.

At this point, it is impossible to know what is likely to happen. The Bush administration’s response and particularly the president’s own words have been relatively restrained. Congress, of course, will follow its usual course of Palestinian-bashing.

It is worth noting that it was Congress that did everything in its power to prevent Bush from taking actions that might have strengthened Abbas *vis-à-vis* Hamas. Last year, for instance, after the president offered the Palestinians \$200 million in aid, Congress took \$50 million out of that package and gave it to Israel to spend on new and improved checkpoints, the same checkpoints that

Cesar Chavez, Minuteman

The UFW leader was no friend to illegal immigration—until he became an ethnic figurehead.

By Steve Sailer

IN CALIFORNIA, only three birthdays are official state holidays: Jesus Christ's, Martin Luther King's, and Cesar Chavez's. Beatification as a secular saint, though, isn't always good for the soul. A recent four-part exposé by reporter Miriam Pawel in the *Los Angeles Times* revealed how the labor leader turned revered ethnic icon descended into paranoia, megalomania, and general crack-pottery in the 15 years before his death in 1993.

Today, his United Farm Workers functions less as a union—it represents only 2 percent of the California agricultural workforce—than as a lucrative Latino-pride fundraising machine providing sinecures for a dozen Chavez relatives. Pawel writes, "Chavez's heirs run a web of tax-exempt organizations that exploit his legacy and invoke the harsh lives of farm workers to raise millions of dollars in public and private money. The money does little to improve the lives of California farm workers, who still struggle with the most basic health and housing needs and try to get by on seasonal, minimum-wage jobs."

From 1965 to 1981, the UFW succeeded in raising wages significantly for stoop laborers in California. Since then, their pay has fallen, and they've lost most of the fringe benefits they had won. Today, most make less than \$10,000 per year. Hundreds were discovered near Salinas living in caves, a mass indignity that even that town's most famous son,

John Steinbeck, barely anticipated in *The Grapes of Wrath*.

Unfortunately, in focusing on gossip about the personal foibles of Chavez and his successors, the *LA Times* series completely ignored the politically incorrect paradox of who was most responsible for wiping out the gains Mexican-American farm workers had achieved through strikes and consumer boycotts: illegal immigrants from Mexico.

Tectonic shifts in demographics made possible both the rise of the UFW after Congress ended the *bracero* guest-worker program in 1964 and the union's fall following the explosion in illegal immigration.

Chavez was a more interesting figure than either the plaster idol worshipped in the public schools or the celebrity control-freak denigrated in the *LA Times*. Chavez embodied both the old class politics and the new identity politics. Out of this duality grew the fundamental conflict of his life. What was more important, *la causa* or *la raza*? The UFW union or the Mexican race? This irresolvable contradiction culminated in the terrible ironies of his tragic later years and the uselessness of the UFW ever since.

During his prime, Chavez, a third-generation American citizen from Yuma, Arizona and Navy veteran, was an American labor leader fighting against the importation of strikebreakers from Mexico. But as power and praise went

to his head, his image morphed into that of a Mexican mestizo racial emblem, the patron saint of the *reconquista* of *Alta California* by *la raza*.

In 2006, we automatically assume that America's self-appointed Latino leaders—the politicians, campaign consultants, media mouthpieces, and identity-politics warriors—favor ever more immigration. Their influence and income flow from their claim to represent vast numbers of Hispanics, so the more warm bodies they can get across the border, the larger will be the ethnic quotas upon which their careers are based. But the union leader who is honestly battling for the welfare of his members—as opposed to the boss merely attempting to maximize the number of dues-paying workers—wants less competition for them.

Chavez's essential problem was straight out of Econ 101, the law of supply and demand. He needed to limit the supply of labor in order to drive up wages. Just as American Federation of Labor founder Samuel Gompers, himself a Jewish immigrant, was one of the most influential voices calling for the successful immigration-restriction law of 1924, Chavez, during his effectual years, was a ferocious opponent of illegal immigration.

His success stemmed from the long-term decline in the farm labor supply. According to agricultural economist Philip L. Martin of the University of

California, Davis, migrant farm workers in the U.S. numbered 2 million in the 1920s. Eisenhower cracked down on Mexican illegal immigrants, shipping one million home in 1954 alone. The famous 1960 “Harvest of Shame” documentary by CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow inspired liberal Democrats in Congress to abolish the *bracero* guest-worker program in 1964. The supply of migrant workers dropped to about 200,000, most of them American citizens, making unionization and better contracts feasible—as long as what Marx called “the reserve army of the unemployed” could be bottled up south of the border. The next year, Chavez began his storied organizing campaign.

Growers fought back by busing the reserve army up from Mexico. In 1979, Chavez bitterly testified to Congress:

... when the farm workers strike and their strike is successful, the employers go to Mexico and have unlimited, unrestricted use of illegal alien strikebreakers to break the strike. And, for over 30 years, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has looked the other way and assisted in the strikebreaking. I do not remember one single instance in 30 years where the Immigration service has removed strikebreakers. ... The employers use professional smugglers to recruit and transport human contraband across the Mexican border for the specific act of strikebreaking...

In 1969, Chavez led a march to the Mexican border to protest illegal immigration. Joining him were Sen. Walter Mondale and Martin Luther King’s successor as head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Ralph Abernathy.

The UFW picketed INS offices to demand closure of the border. Chavez also finked on illegal alien scabs to *la*

migra. Columnist Ruben Navarrette Jr. reported in the *Arizona Republic*, “Cesar Chavez, a labor leader intent on protecting union membership, was as effective a surrogate for the INS as ever existed. Indeed, Chavez and the United Farm Workers Union he headed routinely reported, to the INS, for deportation, suspected illegal immigrants who served as strikebreakers or refused to unionize.”

IN 1969, **CHAVEZ LED A MARCH TO THE MEXICAN BORDER TO PROTEST ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION. JOINING HIM WERE SEN. WALTER MONDALE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING’S SUCCESSOR, RALPH ABERNATHY.**

Like today’s Minutemen, UFW staffers under the command of Chavez’s brother Manuel patrolled the Arizona-Mexico border to keep out illegal aliens. Unlike the well-behaved Minutemen, however, Chavez’s boys sometimes beat up intruders.

Successful unionization typically leads to management investing in mechanization, which reduces the number of jobs. United Mine Workers boss John L. Lewis proclaimed that he intended to force underground coalminers’ wages up so high that his union would shrink. If his members were paid enough today, they could afford to educate their kids to earn a less dangerous living by the time the bosses had figured out how to do without most of them.

During the 1970s, a similarly benign outcome appeared inevitable for American stoop laborers. The inflated piece-work rates paid UFW members impelled simple productivity improvements such as light aluminum ladders for fruit tree pickers, to be followed, it was expected, by mechanization. In Ventura County, the average output of lemon pickers during the UFW’s reign rose from 3.4 boxes per hour in 1965 to 8.4 boxes by

1978. A few more decades of high pay, it appeared, would eventually turn these literally backbreaking jobs into merely a painful memory.

Then the 1982 Mexican economic collapse sent a flood of illegal immigrants north. Growers that had signed generous contracts with the UFW got out of the business and were replaced by new firms that relied upon subcontractors for cheap workers, no questions asked

about their documents. Automation efforts slowed.

The rotten pay and conditions suffered by today’s workers—three laborers died of heat stroke last summer—are a matter of supply and demand. The government can pass regulations, but if there are enough jobseekers on the spot to undercut their fellow workers, laws hardly matter.

Economist Martin has noted, “We have essentially privatized the immigration policy of this country, and left it in the hands of California’s growers.” The benefit to the consumer is minor. Martin notes that about 7 percent of the price paid by shoppers for strawberries goes to the pickers. In return, the public picks up the tab for the workers’ medical care and their children’s schooling. A National Academy of Sciences commission estimated in 1997 that an immigrant without a high-school degree ultimately costs America \$100,000 more than he contributes.

In the 1980s, the UFW declined into irrelevance as it ascended into the pantheon of political correctness. Losing interest in the gritty work of organizing, the aging Chavez began to back mass

immigration as he became a symbol of Latino identity politics.

Chavez's ambivalence about immigration is also widespread among the Latino-American electorate. A 2002 survey by the Pew Hispanic Center found that 48 percent of Latino registered voters felt there were "too many" immigrants in the U.S. today, while only 7 percent thought there were "too few." This shouldn't be startling since Hispanics suffer mass immigration's most direct consequences: lowered wages, stressed schools, and that annoying third cousin from Hermosillo who shows up uninvited and wants to sleep on the couch until he gets himself established in a few years.

Yet when the Pew interviewers immediately rephrased the question in ethnocentric terms to read, "Thinking about *Latin American* immigrants who come to work in the United States," suddenly only 21 percent of Latino voters wanted to "reduce the number" and 36 percent wished to "allow more." Thus, Hispanic activists can easily arouse for their own profit understandable but irrational racial chauvinism.

The emergence of a truly *Latino-American* leader like the young Chavez, one more interested in the economic advancement of his own American ethnic group than in identity politics, would be good for American Hispanics, good for other Americans, and good for Mexico as well. As former Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge G. Castaneda has admitted, the mostly unfenced border allows Mexico's largely white ruling class to bleed off the discontented poor rather than make the fundamental reforms necessary to fix that dysfunctional country. Yet any of that is unlikely as long as the truth about Chavez is so little known. ■

Steve Sailer is TAC's film critic and a columnist for VDARE.com.

Britain, which is already the most photographed country in the world due to an extensive system of security cameras, is about to go one step farther.

The proposed Automatic Number Plate Recognition system will rely on the numerous cameras that are already in place on Britain's roadways supplemented by new ones where coverage is considered to be inadequate. The objective is to record all cars on all roads, amounting to 50 million transits per day, reading the license plates and storing the information for two years. As the plates are read, they will automatically be checked against a central database for possible criminal or terrorist connections. Some see the move as particularly Orwellian, but Prime Minister Tony Blair describes it as an essential tool to combat terrorism. Blair is also attempting to introduce biometric ID cards for the British public, a move that is being strongly resisted in the House of Lords.



Is there a new water-gate brewing? The CIA has initiated an internal investigation of the agency's third-ranking official, Executive Director Kyle Dustin Foggo, known as Dusty, over charges that he had business connections to corrupt former California Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham. Investigators are looking into allegations that Foggo, who was an administrative officer involved in procurement, may have given contracts to suppliers with whom he and his political cronies had financial or personal interests. It is reported that he recently gave the lucrative contract to supply water to CIA facilities in Iraq to businessman Brent Wilkes, a conspirator associate of Cunningham. It is also alleged that Foggo obtained his position in the first place through the urging of Cunningham, who is a close friend of CIA Director Porter Goss. Wilkes and Foggo are former college roommates who are so close that they have named their sons after each other. Foggo has worked at the CIA since 1982. During his time in the agency, he was responsible for the awarding of numerous no-bid noncompetitive contracts for supplies and services.



An Italian judge has formally asked the United States to permit questioning of 22 named CIA officers

who are wanted in connection with the kidnapping and rendition of the Egyptian cleric Abu Omar from a Milan street in February 2003, but the government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is unlikely to support the request. The CIA operation, which is particularly embarrassing to all parties involved because it was run with the connivance of the Italian intelligence service SISMI, was poorly managed and marked by incompetence. Most of the CIA officers were carrying passports with false names, but at least four have been identified by their true names through phone records because they could not resist the urge to call their families. In one case, a female officer who was traveling on a false passport produced a frequent flyer card in her true name at her hotel so that she could receive mileage credit. Abu Omar was rendered to Egypt where he was allegedly tortured. The CIA chief from Milan reportedly flew to Cairo to assist in the interrogation.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a partner in Cannistraro Associates.

Report Card

Kinder, gentler education bureaucrats, but where are the results?

By W. James Antle III

FOUR YEARS AFTER the Bush administration's signature education reform became law, you might think that there would be some consensus as to whether No Child Left Behind (NCLB) is passing or failing. You would be wrong. There are almost as many competing assessments of the program's impact—and how its flaws should be fixed, if they can be at all—as there are public schools.

Depending on who is asked, NCLB is either wildly expensive or woefully underfunded, a massive encroachment on state and local prerogatives or an overly loose patchwork of varying state standards, unrealistically draconian or ineffectually lax. And that's just among experts in the education field. So what should laymen make of this curious policy?

NCLB encapsulates the quirks of the Bush administration's domestic policymaking. Its architects borrowed liberally from the ideas of centrist new Democrats about how to mend federal education meddling, not end it. It wedded liberal spending programs to conservative goals of standards, accountability, and transparency (less so the goal of parental choice). And the legislation showcased President Bush as a uniter, not a divider, partnering him with Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and passing with strong support from Democrats and Republicans alike.

While the compassionate conservative also claims to be a reformer with results, Bush marked NCLB's anniversary by praising how much it cost. Speaking in Maryland, he noted that since 2001, Title I education spending is up 45 percent, the elementary and

secondary education program has increased by 41 percent, and spending on Reading First has quadrupled. The Democrats who worked with Bush on NCLB say the funding is inadequate, but it sounds like compassionate enough conservatism.

What about the reformer with results? The administration emphasizes recent rises in national test scores, especially for blacks and Hispanics. Neal McCluskey, education policy analyst for the Cato Institute, notes that the National Assessment of Educational Progress paints a murkier picture. Since NCLB's passage, math scores have risen for everyone except 17-year-olds while reading scores are stagnant or falling for everyone except fourth-graders. "The bottom line is that there's little evidence students are learning more as a result of NCLB," says McCluskey.

Criticism of the act is bipartisan. Utah's Republican legislature and governor, now in negotiations with the Department of Education, have revolted against NCLB. Connecticut's GOP Gov. Jodi Rell is backing a lawsuit by her state to challenge the law's testing requirements. To many conservatives in state legislatures, the problem isn't underfunding but overreach. They have found unlikely allies in traditionally Democratic teachers' unions, particularly the National Education Association, whose leaders have an aversion to accountability schemes that emphasize high-stakes testing.

The debate reflects the inherent difficulties of having the federal government, which supplies less than 10 percent of

national education funding, influence schools throughout the country. NCLB requires public schools to measure student performance, based on testing at specified intervals, and meet certain goals along the way to proficiency for all students by 2014. To prevent educators from focusing on aggregate test scores while ignoring disadvantaged children, the law recognizes sub-groups of poor, minority, and handicapped students who also must show improvement. Persistently failing schools are subject to gradually stronger penalties, but many of the intended beneficiaries find the testing requirements onerous.

"In the 1990s, a lot of education money was going to states with no strings attached," says Dan Lips, an education policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation. "NCLB added a few too many strings." Now even many liberal education professionals are singing the praises of local control.

The Bush administration has recognized that NCLB is becoming a political liability and is starting to modify its sales pitch. Flexibility has become an Education Department buzzword alongside accountability and transparency. Education Secretary Margaret Spellings is leading the charge. She helped design the law while working in the White House domestic-policy shop and upon moving to Education was among its fiercest defenders, often offending critics with her strong rhetoric. Now *Forbes* and the *Washington Post* have run stories about a kinder, gentler Spellings.

Spellings has been granting waivers to some states that have chafed at NCLB

mandates and loosening rules so that fewer schools will be labeled failing. She relaxed testing requirements for disabled students nationwide, amidst complaints that they were unworkable, and gave states a one-year extension on a teacher-quality deadline. She has allowed experimentation with different ways of measuring improved student performance and eased regulations on battered Gulf Coast schools.

But some education-policy experts believe the Spellings makeover is just the second half of a two-part strategy. First the administration sought to convince states that they were serious about NCLB's dictates; now they are working to mollify opponents. "Spellings isn't any more flexible than [former Secretary] Rod Paige," says Michael Petrilli, vice president for national policy at the Thomas B. Fordham Institute. "She just changed her position. She made a tactical decision as secretary."

These retreats have come under attack by people who fear that NCLB's get-tough approach is being undermined in order to buy short-term political advantage. "In some cases she's gone too far," says Petrilli. "You don't want to give away the store with waivers."

Even before the Education Department began its flexibility push, there were concerns that NCLB was vulnerable to state dilution. The federal government establishes goals, but states still determine course content, test questions, and test scores. Kevin Carey, research and policy manager for Education Sector, a D.C.-based education think tank, notes, "States have total discretion over what to learn, academic standards, what tests to administer, and what scores to give." That could give states the power to raise scores by making the tests easier. Missouri, for example, recently lowered the passing score on its state assessment test.

As with so many issues surrounding

NCLB, the results are unclear. Petrilli worries that states will find it easier to engage in a "race to the bottom" than meet higher standards. Education Sector's Carey disagrees. "It's not like states had high standards before NCLB," he says. "The law provides no structure for states to compete with each other."

NCLB thus bumps up against two old education-reform paradoxes. Just as voters often give low ratings to Congress but re-elect their own congressman, many parents have a low opinion of the education system generally but give high marks to their own children's schools and teachers. How much pressure they will actually apply on those schools and teachers to maintain high standards is unclear.

It is also the case that before NCLB, states that were inclined to pursue education reform could do so, and even after the law's passage they retain significant power to thwart reformers' objectives. This may show the limits of federal education interventions—or be an impetus for further centralization. "Your readers probably won't like this, but the only way to end the race to the bottom is a rigorous national test," argues Petrilli. "We've already passed the threshold with NCLB."

"We need an even more flexible education policy, with more federalism and local control," contends Heritage's Lips. "Too much of the focus has been on accountability to the federal government, not accountability to parents."

Next year, NCLB passes an even more important milestone. It will come up for reauthorization and its many foes will have the opportunity to persuade Congress to make changes or scrap it entirely. Since the law's detractors span the political spectrum, many of the reform suggestions are likely to be lost in the din. But two ideas, one popular with conservatives and the other with liberals, are likely to be debated in one form or another.

Conservatives will push for expanded school choice. Currently, NCLB only allows students trapped in failing schools the choice of attending another public school in the same district. In practice, this may translate into a choice between two low-quality schools. Even that much choice may be lacking, as competing schools don't have the slots available to accommodate new students. Expect proposals to rectify the situation by allowing parents to choose public schools in another district, expanding access to charter schools, and even creating private-school voucher programs in selected cities. "It's a real good opportunity to increase parental choice and redesign federal education policy," says Lips.

Liberals may propose changes in the way test scores are used. Instead of having groups of students progress toward a universal standard, they say it is fairer to minorities and the poor to look at individual student growth. Their argument is that a value-added metric would better take into account different starting points.

Observers don't see dramatic changes. The administration hasn't made much progress expanding NCLB into high school. And despite differences over funding levels, Democrats and Republicans don't seem ready to back away from NCLB's basic framework. Many professional education reformers still think it's a good start. Petrilli expects "more of a tinkering than an overhaul."

Popular criticism of the law hasn't translated into an effective anti-NCLB coalition because opponents are divided between people who desire less federal involvement in education and those who advocate even more.

NCLB's champions claim any meaningful reform will be attacked from both sides. "If everybody was happy with No Child Left Behind, it wouldn't be doing its job," Petrilli maintains. This much is true: not everybody is happy. ■

War in Error

Sending a general to do a sheriff's job

By Andrew J. Bacevich

SMALL EVENTS sometimes reveal large truths. Last month's U.S. missile strike in the remote Bajaur district of Pakistan was such an event. Aimed at taking out Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's chief deputy, the strike missed its intended target and killed as many as 18 residents of the small village of Damadola. But the episode did not end there: outraged Pakistanis rose up in protest; days of highly publicized anti-American demonstrations followed. In effect, the United States had handed Muslims around the world another grievance to hold against Americans.

In stark, unmistakable terms, the Damadola affair lays bare the defects of the Bush administration's response to 9/11. When President Bush in September 2001 launched the United States on a global war against terrorism, he scornfully abandoned the law-enforcement approach to which previous administrations had adhered. To all but the most militant true believers, it has become increasingly evident that in doing so Bush committed an error of the first order.

Underlying Bush's declaration of war were two assumptions: first, that terrorism is subject to defeat; second, that military power, aggressively employed, offers the shortest road to victory. The Damadola incident only adds to the mountain of evidence calling both of those assumptions into question.

As most Americans have come to understand, terrorism, as currently employed in Washington's political lexicon, is a code word. Seemingly referring to a tactic, it actually alludes to the violent

Islamic radicals who perpetrated 9/11 and who if given the chance will attack us again.

In dealing with the radicals themselves, the old adage applies: it's kill or be killed. On this point there can be little room for debate and none for compromise. But for the killing to be purposeful, it must occur selectively: to employ violence indiscriminately is to replenish the ranks of al-Qaeda and its spawn faster than we can deplete them. That way lies not security but bankruptcy and exhaustion.

Although paying lip service to this principle, the Bush administration has violated it in practice, most egregiously in Iraq, where heavy-handed tactics fanned the flames of insurgency, but also in Afghanistan and now Pakistan. Using President Bush's conception of war as their mandate—and at times as a *de facto* grant of immunity—U.S. forces charged with bringing the guilty to book have too often ended up victimizing the innocent.

The fault lies less with the soldiers who pull the triggers, aim the missiles, and drop the bombs than with the nature of war itself. Even in a high-tech age, it remains a blunt instrument. Precision weapons have not made war precise, a truth brought home yet again by the events at Damadola.

It's hard to tell which more vividly testifies to this president's stupefying hubris: his self-proclaimed mission to democratize the Middle East or his claim that his administration is reinventing war. It's probably a toss-up. The truth is that war remains today what it has always been: fraught with risk, uncer-

tainty, and chance. When the unexpected happens, bystanders with the misfortune to be in the wrong place at the wrong time are most likely to suffer the consequences.

Granted, in some circumstances, the penalty for killing innocent civilians is nil. The Anglo-American "Transportation Plan" of World War II—the 1944 strategic bombing of Occupied Europe in preparation for the Normandy invasion—caused the deaths of some 12,000 citizens of France and Belgium. Whatever moral questions this bombing campaign might have raised, most of which remain largely unexamined, the blood-letting in no way impeded the Allied march to final victory. In the brutal calculus of that war, sacrificing some number of those whom the Allies were promising to liberate was "worth it."

But outside of the bounds of total war, killing civilians—even unintentionally—becomes politically problematic. The attack at Damadola illustrates the consequences.

For the United States to unleash a salvo of missiles at a Pakistani village thought to house an al-Qaeda chieftain is the equivalent of the Mexican government bombing a southern California condo complex suspected of harboring a drug kingpin. Even if, as the Pakistani government has subsequently claimed, the missiles killed a handful of unidentified "foreign militants," that minor success can in no way justify the use of force that takes the lives of women and children. Morally, the arithmetic doesn't work. Politically, it's even worse.

For the United States government to shrug off those deaths with expressions of regret or offers of monetary compensation simply confirms the worst that others have come to believe: that Americans are callous and arrogant with little regard for the lives of Muslims.

In depicting the attack on the World Trade Center as the opening volley of a global war—a reprise of Dec. 7, 1941—the Bush administration spun the awful events of that day in the wrong direction. The Islamists may nurse bizarre dreams of restoring the caliphate, but their existing claim to political legitimacy is marginal. Al-Qaeda is not the Wehrmacht or the Red Army; it is an international conspiracy, one that committed a singularly heinous crime. Osama bin Laden is not Hitler or Stalin—as a historical figure he comes nowhere near their baneful significance. He is a Mafioso.

When gangs besiege a neighborhood, the authorities send in more cops. If the authorities are smart, they insist upon the cops playing by the rules. Winning back the streets means taking the thugs out of circulation while protecting those who obey the laws. Coercion wielded without restraint only makes matters worse.

So too with the threat posed by radical Islam. Preventing a recurrence of 9/11 requires not war on a global scale, but the sustained, relentless enforcement of international norms. The task requires not an army but a posse. Rather than invasions and stand-off missile attacks, we need police and intelligence agencies, backed by special-operations forces, bringing the perpetrators of terror to justice, while taking care not to incite more Muslims to join the Islamist cause.

On Sept. 11, 2001, the law-enforcement approach to dealing with the Islamist conspiracy did fail. Yet it failed not because such an approach is inherently defective but as a result of incompetence

and ineptitude at the highest levels of the United States government, evident in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

By the time this essay appears, the Bush administration will have moved on. As far as official Washington is concerned, the nameless, faceless dead of Damadola are already forgotten. Our warrior-president will continue to insist that we have no choice but to press on, seemingly blind to the moral havoc wreaked by his war and oblivious to the extent to which he is playing into the hands of our adversaries.

But our own interests demand that we not forget those whom we have killed. At Damadola we have handed the Islamists a victory of considerable proportions, further enflaming antipathy toward the U.S. in Pakistan and among Muslims generally. And the lesson to be taken from this self-inflicted defeat is clear: four bloody years into President Bush's war, the time to think anew is at hand. ■

Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, is a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.

Don't Democratize

Deterrence worked with the Soviets. Why not Iran?

By John Laughland

LET US ASSUME, for the sake of argument, that the neoconservative view of the world is correct. The world contains a number of states dedicated to threatening U.S. allies and perpetrating terrorist attacks. Although the war on terror has already involved the invasion of two major Muslim countries (Afghanistan and Iraq), a third country, Iran, has now emerged as a new threat. The proposed solution is the democratization of the whole planet—in George W. Bush's words, “the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”

During most of the Cold War, the hawks whom we now call neoconservatives dismissed all talk of resolving international disputes through treaties or international organizations. They scoffed at the sight of Jimmy Carter leading the geriatric Leonid Brezhnev by the arm to sign the latest bilateral arms-reduction treaty. They insisted that Soviet

expansionism needed to be contained by military might. Yet even while Ronald Reagan and Caspar Weinberger proactively stepped full throttle on military spending to defeat the Soviets, no one suggested pre-emptively attacking their nuclear installations.

That belief was known as the doctrine of deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War it has been consigned to the dustbin of history. Today's neocons do not conclude from the possibility that Iran might obtain the bomb that countermeasures must be taken to deter her from ever using it. Instead, they bleat that Iran is infringing the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—one of the stupidest treaties ever to have entered the annals of diplomacy because it elevates hypocrisy to a principle of international law by saying that only some states are allowed to have nuclear warheads—just as they alleged, falsely, that

Saddam Hussein's sin was to have violated some 12-year-old and largely forgotten Security Council resolutions.

In the academic jargon of international-relations theory, therefore, the hawks have shifted from realism to idealism. Whereas previously they believed that the only reality in international relations was force, they are now drenched in that universalist faith in international institutions that is usually associated with the arch-idealist Woodrow Wilson. To be sure, some neocons bluster against the UN, but President Bush's stated goal of liberating the whole of humanity is far closer to the one-world ideology that inspired the creation of the League of Nations than it is to the pessimistic *realpolitik* of Henry Kissinger.

The main difference between Woodrow Wilson and the neocons today is that the universalist ideology that they use to liquidate recalcitrant societies contains a double strychnine dose of one-world economic globalization plus the homogenized trash culture of MTV and its associated vices of drugs and sex. Western opponents of the "evil empire" were right when they calculated that the slab-faced old Commies sitting behind desks in Moscow would be no match for the pony-tailed new Commies who sang with John Lennon, "Imagine there's no countries, It isn't hard to do, Nothing to kill or die for, No religion too." Just as the walls of Jericho were brought down by trumpets, and just as General Noriega was flushed out of the Papal Nunciature in Managua in 1989 by blaring rock music, so what remained of social conservatism behind the Berlin Wall was instantly dissolved by the hideous cacophony of Western postmodernism.

This abandonment of deterrence shows that political-ideological leveling out, what the Nazis called *Gleichschaltung*, is the key to the neocon view of the world. Whereas deterrence assumed that the existence, somewhere in the

world, of unfriendly and even evil regimes was as certain as death and taxes, and that a wise government consequently needed to keep such threats at bay, the neocons today believe that the very existence of hostile or even non-aligned regimes is a threat. Deterrence assumed a certain degree of political pluralism on the planet, whereas neocons believe with George W. Bush that "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands." Today's neocons are the modern Athenians who told the inhabitants of Melos that their neutrality in the war against Sparta was intolerable.

Neocons believe, as George W. Bush said in 2002, that the great struggles of the 20th century have ended in the decisive victory of "a single sustainable model for national success." They welcomed the end of the Cold War precisely because it overcame the division of the world into competing political systems and seemed to create in its place the beginnings of a monolithic unipolar world system with America and American values—especially universal human rights—as its ideological core. Islam presents an obstacle to the full realization of this goal and this is why neocons have now announced that they intend to "democratize" the whole of the Middle East as well.

Yet it is these underlying beliefs about the international system that give the lie to the neocon claim to want to democratize the planet. Even if we leave aside the abuses committed in the name of democratization—from 1953, when the CIA overthrew Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran, to 2004, when spooky American technicians of regime change installed a friendly government in Kiev—it is simply incredible that a plan for worldwide democratization should now involve singling out Iran as an enemy. For the Islamic Republic of Iran is undoubtedly one of the most advanced democracies in the Muslim world.

Such a statement will doubtless surprise those who think of Iran as groaning under the yoke of a stifling theocracy and who associate it with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. But there is no denying that the normal state institutions of the Islamic Republic are impeccably democratic. The president and the legislature are directly elected by universal suffrage, including women; the political system is extremely vibrant, the latest presidential election having been far more hotly contested than the equivalent one in 2005 in Egypt; there is a basically free press, in which politicians including the president are frequently criticized, and the Iranian constitution gives equal rights to all citizens irrespective of race or sex, forbids the investigation of individuals' beliefs and the state inspection of letters or other forms of private communication, and guarantees *habeas corpus*, the presumption of innocence, and equality before the law. The Islamic Republic's political system is at the very antipodes of the absolute monarchy that reigns in neighboring Saudi Arabia, America's ally. There are no elements of democracy whatever in that country's national political life, which is why many Iranian leaders, including the fiery president, regard it as disgracefully backward.

To be sure, the Iranian constitution also contains peculiar elements found in no other state, most importantly the office of Supreme Leader, who commands the armed forces, appoints the Council of Guardians—a theological body that scrutinizes laws passed by the legislature—and controls the state broadcasting network and the police. These powers are not wielded democratically. But all states contain constitutional elements that are specifically designed to mitigate the effects of direct democracy, the U.S. Supreme Court being the best example of a powerful unelected body that intervenes actively in matters of public policy

in the name of unchangeable principles. And whatever the written provisions in the Iranian constitution, it is undeniable that the country's domestic politics are extremely fluid. Indeed one of the country's main failings is that the various factions battle it out so overtly that the rule of law suffers considerably: Iranian citizens often do not know which way state authority is going to strike next.

Finally, even the theocratic elements in the Iranian constitution themselves draw legitimacy—however bogusly—from the Islamic Revolution's claim to have been a democratic movement. I do not personally care for revolutions of any kind, but there can be little doubt that the 1979 Iranian revolution did in fact succeed because of popular hatred for a dictatorial foreign-backed regime. Add to all this the fact that the form of Islam preached in Iran is itself self-consciously progressive—even conservative Iranian clerics dismiss the Islam of the Taliban or the Wahhabis as atavistic—and you have a country that American democratists ought to embrace as a model for the rest of the Muslim world.

But as the horrified reaction to the election of Hamas in Palestine shows, the neocon commitment to democratization is as much about free choice as are the options offered to a shopkeeper when the Mafia comes round to collect the protection money. "It's up to you," the gangsters say as they crack their knuckles with a nonchalant smirk. "You can do what you like. But your sister over there, now she's a very pretty girl ..." A commitment to democracy implies a commitment to pluralism and to the possibility that people may make choices with which we do not agree. This is precisely why neoconservatives are determined to prevent it. ■

John Laughland is a London-based writer and lecturer and a trustee of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group.

Food for Thought

Farmers' markets and family meals are essentially conservative.

By Rod Dreher

I GREW UP in a town without a McDonald's. It's hard to express how humiliating this was, to watch fast-food commercials knowing we were condemned to settle for our local hamburger joints. Or worse, home cooking.

I think back to how my mom's counter would groan with fresh tomatoes, green beans, squash, and cucumbers from our own garden—stuff that I wanted nothing to do with because it didn't come from a fast-food joint or from the supermarket. For me, the height of home-prepared culinary delight was a Swanson's TV dinner just like I'd seen in the ads. Unsurprisingly, I was a fat kid.

I didn't give my diet a second thought until I married and moved with my wife Julie to New York City. Suddenly, I felt the obligation to be a grown-up about things, and that meant getting serious about my diet. With the eye-popping bounty of the Union Square farmer's market available to us every Saturday, when farmers from all over the region bring their fruits and vegetables into the heart of the city, we got interested in cooking. I'll never forget the pale green of the creamy sorrel soup Julie made for our first Easter dinner together, and the salty crunch of the crusty leg of lamb we prepared and ate together at the table by the window of our sunny little apartment.

We laugh today, recalling that first year together, lying in bed reading, and me pulling my head out of *Martha Stewart Living* one night and saying, "I had

no idea butter was this interesting." It's easy to make fun of that kind of yuppie talk, but the plain fact was that butter is a lot more interesting than we had ever imagined. Neither of us had been taught to cook, and we really don't blame our mothers. They were raised working-class in the rural South and were hit with a wave of 1950s better-living-through-chemistry propaganda, telling women that traditional cooking was drudge work and that processed food was a status symbol. The same advertising that made me doubt the worth of my town because we couldn't get Dolly Madison snack cakes had worked its wicked enchantment on my mom's generation. Julie and I found ourselves wishing we could spend time with our grandmothers to find out what they knew about cooking that our mothers did not.

As time went on, we got better at cooking and even today, years removed from those magical New York nights, whenever we prepare some of those favorite recipes, I can't help recalling Peggy's laugh, Father Wilson's funny stories, Santo's pulling the cork out of a bottle of Italian red, and the manifold joys of good friends and good feasts.

I'd go to Staubit, the venerable sawdust-covered butcher shop on Court Street. The succulent taste of that meat would convey in part the pleasure of knowing our butcher and the pleasantries that would pass between us as we talked about meat, the weather, kids, the neighborhood. The bread we'd eat with our

steak came from Christophe, the young Frenchman who ran a deli on Clinton Street. If we were feeling flush, Julie and I would buy a piece of chevre wrapped in a chestnut leaf. And if we were feeling really flush, we'd stop by Tuller, the neighborhood cheese shop, and buy a wedge of Humboldt Fog and a thin slab of manchego. We'd think hard about what would make us and our friends happy, choose thoughtfully, and prepare it with as much affection as we could muster.

We learned in this way that food, properly understood, is sacramental; it carries within it the care of the farmers who raised it and the merchant who sold it, the love and devotion of the hands that prepared it, and the happiness of the friends and family who share it.

True, not every dinner is a special occasion. But families these days don't even eat dinner together; everybody's too busy to slow down and smell the pot roast. The imperative to convenience, ease, cheapness—efficiency above everything—has created an enormous, and enormously lucrative, American food industry.

WHAT IS LIFE FOR? IF IT'S MERELY ABOUT FULFILLING MATERIAL NEEDS, THEN YOU COULD EAT A POWERBAR IN FRONT OF THE TV EVERY NIGHT AND LET THAT BE THAT.

What does this have to do with conservatism? It all goes back to first principles and the question: what is life for? If it's merely about fulfilling material needs, then you could eat a PowerBar in front of the TV every night and let that be that. There is no utilitarian reason to devote hours to preparing a delicious meal when you can save time by popping some tinfoil-encased gob of processed junk into the oven. Food not only nourishes the body, but it, and the rituals surrounding its preparation, nourish something in the human soul. When Julie and I would pick up our veg-

etables at the community-supported agriculture (CSA) co-op, we urbanites were participating directly in a system that supported agrarian life, which we hold to be a moral good.

I suppose a bit of that is sentimentality, but mostly it's gratitude. When you learn to love cooking, you also learn to be mindful of and thankful for the quality of your ingredients. And when you learn how much care goes into the preparation of something good to eat, you can't help reflecting on how very much more of the same went into raising it and growing it. As we got to know how those CSA farmers lived, we came to respect them for honoring the agrarian farming tradition, defined by Wendell Berry as "the proper use and care of an immeasurable gift."

When we bought our meat from the neighborhood butcher, whose shop had been in that same spot for over 100 years and who knew our names, we were personalizing commercial transactions and nurturing the economy of Cobble Hill, Brooklyn, the little patch of the planet where we lived and over which we had

been given responsibility because of our having chosen to be there. By "economy," I don't mean strictly commerce but the system of human relations that bound us as a community. By choosing to shop at those places, we chose to conserve that rare and precious thing: a sense of beloved place in a world where the quest for efficiency and the bottom line annihilate tradition and atomize families and communities.

We got hooked into the co-op in our Brooklyn neighborhood because the vegetables tasted so much better than what we could buy at the supermarket,

but once we learned more about how these vegetables were produced, we had the good feeling of knowing that we were supporting small farmers. It's plain to see how much the identity of these men and women is tied to their labor in the fields, and while I don't want to get mystical over a bunch of carrots, it's worthwhile to meditate on these things. Learning the names of the farmers and coming to appreciate what they do is to reverse the sweeping process of alienation from the earth and from each other that the mass production of food-stuff has wrought.

At first I thought of small-scale organic farming as a sort of boutique thing—pleasant, like artisanal micro-brewed beers, but only that. Then I started looking into how the government regulates the meat industry. Our regulatory system is designed to favor industrialized meat production, with its factory farms, its cattle jabbed with antibiotics and growth hormones, and its chickens raised in cages filled with their own feces.

We are told that small-scale farming is inefficient—this is true—and that because factory farms feed the masses, and do so cheaply, we should be satisfied. Just keep the stuff showing up under cellophane in the supermarket cooler, and keep it cheap, and we'll ask no questions. But in striking that devil's bargain, we sign away our responsibility for what's in that food, how it got there, and what was done to human communities to close the deal. I understand the free-market reasons why Americans do this. But I don't understand why it is called conservative.

You don't have to be a conservative to appreciate the healthful and sensual value of good food, but there are profoundly conservative reasons for taking food culture seriously. The second of Kirk's famed Six Canons of Conservative Thought is: "Affection for the prolif-

erating variety and mystery of traditional life, as distinguished from the narrowing uniformity and equalitarianism and utilitarian aims of most radical systems." The traditional conservative will want to take a stand for the mom-and-pop cheesemaker over the pasteurized processed cheese food disgorged by the factory and sold cheaply.

Jenny Drake is a former state health inspector turned organic livestock farmer who wanted to raise chickens and cattle without using hormones and antibiotics, which are ubiquitous in factory farming. Those healthy chickens were a problem, though. The state of Tennessee refuses to let any chicken be sold unless the USDA inspects the processing facilities. Alas, there are no custom-kill processing plants for chickens in the entire American southeast. Drake told me that to build a small processing facility to meet federal guidelines would cost her about \$150,000.

"The Americans With Disabilities Act, for example, means a small producer has to put in restrooms that are handicapped-accessible," she told me. "I'd have to build an office for the inspector. That office has to have its own phone line. I'd have to put in a paved parking lot. We have to meet the same physical standards as a Tyson's"—the industrial chicken megaproducer—"and we just can't do it."

With barriers that make it virtually impossible to raise meat the old-fashioned way, it's no wonder family farms are disappearing. That's too bad, you might say, but isn't that a small price to pay for keeping the nation's meat supply safe? Arguably yes—if the factory-farming system actually did so. But as Eric Schlosser documented in his bestselling *Fast-Food Nation*, America's factory-farming industry has caused the rates of food-borne illness to shoot up and resulted in a host of ancillary environmental problems as well.

Now it's hard to slow down and prepare food yourself. It's a chore to think about what you're eating, and where that food came from. Once you start pulling that thread, a whole lot of assumptions we use to conceal unpleasant realities begin to unravel. It's easier to let big business and the government do our thinking for us. Wendell Berry writes:

The food industrialists have by now persuaded millions of consumers to prefer food that is already prepared. They will grow, deliver, and cook your food for you and (just like your mother) beg you to eat it. That they do not yet offer to insert it, prechewed, into your mouth is only because they have found no profitable way to do so. We may rest assured that they would be glad to find such a way. The ideal industrial food consumer would be strapped to a table with a tube running from the food factory directly into his or her stomach.

And when people object to this, right-wingers make fun of them as food fad-dists. I know, because I used to do it myself, as a self-defense mechanism.

Joel Salatin has been in the small-scale sustainable farming vocation a long time. He's also a political and religious conservative. I asked him what he says to our fellow right-wingers who call what he does "romantic," and who say it will never feed the world.

"The premise of that statement is based on false modeling," Joel told me. "We in the conservative community love the scientific method, double-blind studies, that sort of thing, as opposed to the Eastern mindset, which thinks more holistically, and more along the lines of 'we' than 'I.'"

That's what British economist E.F. Schumacher found when he went East to study Buddhism in 1950. He discov-

ered that thinking of economic questions as distinct from human society, with all its variables, could result in greater material output but at the cost of a greater harmony needed to sustain the happiness and well being of the community.

Joel continued: "Conservatives tend to ask how can we be more efficient, not how we can be more effective. You can be very efficient at the wrong thing. The Eastern mindset brings to the equation a whole individual, a whole-system approach, understanding that there's an equilibrium, a balance to be maintained. If you grow that chicken to four pounds in four weeks instead of eight weeks, there will be tradeoffs. It's important to understand that when people have this notion that this kind of production model can't feed the world, they have this very myopic, unholistic, fragmented research that prejudices or jaundices their thinking."

"Look at the environmental cost of factory farming. A lot of the ecological cost of flooding is because all the chemical fertilizers have burned out the porosity of the soil, and the soil is not as spongy and resilient as before. One of the questions people like me ask is: can this be done for 500 more years? And the answer is no, it can't, and not only that, but we are beginning to do things that are completely outside the realm of any historical precedent, like genetic engineering. When you're a Christian like I am, it's very worrying."

As far as Joel is concerned, too many religious conservatives separate church from life. He brought up a well-known chicken magnate who has a reputation for being an evangelical Christian.

"But his chicken-processing plants are consistently raided by immigration agents who find illegal aliens working there," Joel said. "The children of those illegals come in and clog the school systems. And so what happens is the

taxpayers end up picking up the tab for the additional school buildings that have to be built because suddenly all the classroom space that was used for instruction are now used for English as a Second Language tutorials.”

Joel listed several other serious social and moral problems resulting from the chicken tycoon’s exploitation of illegal Mexican labor. “My point is that when I eat that brand of chicken, I am supporting all that. People don’t see that. See, that’s the disconnect. We wouldn’t for a minute say let’s go to the cheapest church in town, let’s hire the cheapest preacher we can get. We wouldn’t say let’s go to the cheapest brain surgeon. But we’re very happy to put on the lowest respect level and honor level the stewards of our food system and the stewards of our landscape.”

Now perhaps you feel admonished by all this talk of how we have sinned and fallen short of the glory of a righteous T-bone and an immaculately conceived rutabaga. Enough with the long faces! I hold in my hand a most extraordinary cookbook, a delirious 1967 tome called *The Supper of the Lamb*. Its author is an Episcopal priest, Robert Farrar Capon, an amateur chef whose cookery manual is an exuberant tribute to the sacramental vision at work and at play in the kitchen. Father Capon’s entire book stands as a rebuke to the plodding dullness of the materialist for whom an onion is just an onion—but also the error of taking it far too seriously.

“The world exists not for what it means, but for what it is,” he writes. “... It is a false piety that walks through creation looking only for lessons which can be applied somewhere else.” For the person who sees the acts of growing and raising and cooking and eating *only* as moral acts, the simple pleasure of a sipping the savory juices from a well-roasted chicken with a chunk of French

bread becomes elusive; he has turned himself into a superstitious pagan fearful of raising the ire of the gods. In such a case, Father Capon warns, “religion devours life,” and “creation becomes too meaningful to make love to.”

In writing about wine, Father Capon chastises both snobs who value the thing as an end and Puritans who would deny it on moral grounds. “We were made in the image of God. We were created to delight, as He does, in the resident goodness of creation. We were not made to sit around mumbling incantations and watching our insides to see what creation will do for us. ... It was St. Thomas, again, who gave the most reasonable and relaxed of all the definitions of temperance. Wine, he said, could lawfully be drunk *utque ad hilaritatem*, to the point of cheerfulness. It is a happy example of the connection between sanctity and sanity.”

These wise words should serve as a guiding principle for conservative thought about the proper relation between our daily bread and our daily lives. Few of us could stand to live in a world in which every bite of broccoli and every morsel of meatloaf bore the weight of humanity’s fallenness. I am not fond of Puritanism, and that pofaced righteousness you so often find among employees of health-food stores. If taking the quality of one’s food and its connection to the natural environment seriously turned one into this kind of tree-hugging teetotaler, then I would want nothing to do with it.

In a perfect world, lawmakers would roll back the worst excesses of factory farming, change the agricultural regulatory scheme to give small producers a chance to compete, and encourage through tax incentives the development of small-scale, local agriculture. But this is not likely to happen anytime soon.

The good news is that we don’t have to wait for the government to act to take

responsibility ourselves for creating conditions for cleaner, healthier agriculture, simply by choosing to meditate on the way we eat—that is, considering the sacramentality of our food and food traditions—and choosing to spend our money and our efforts wisely.

I’m not about to move out to the country and raise chickens, and neither are most of you. But urbanites and suburbanites like me and thee can make it possible for others to do so by buying their meat, eggs, vegetables and dairy products. We can also encourage legislators to change state and federal regulations to make it easier for businesses like this to prosper. Joel Salatin doesn’t want a handout from the government; he just wants the regulatory climate to change to “free up the entrepreneurial spirit in the countryside.”

Does this sound romantic and utopian? Maybe. But the romance is part of the allure of it, and besides, what’s the alternative? How long do you think we can keep living as we do, destroying the countryside to produce mountains of processed food that makes us less healthy? Care for this trust obliges all of us, but conservatives, because we profess a particular commitment to upholding tradition, are especially responsible for stewardship of the land and its cultural legacy. If we live as if we have no duty to the land and the agrarian traditions of the people who live there, then we ought to be ashamed to call ourselves conservatives. We are no more than market-mad consumers who vote Republican and whose commitment to conservative ideals ends the moment it costs something. ■

Rod Dreher is a writer and editor at the Dallas Morning News. Adapted from the book Crunchy Cons by Rod Dreher. Copyright © 2006 by Rod Dreher. Published by Crown Forum, a division of Random House, Inc.

War of the Worlds

The West doesn't have to choose between Huxley's dystopian future and Islam's medieval past.

By William S. Lind

THE DECONSTRUCTIONISTS are mistaken when they argue that in literature text is everything. When we come to the subject of grand strategy, however, it is correct to say that context is everything. Nothing illustrates the point better than the interventionists' habit of presenting every situation as a replay of Munich 1938. In reality, in a world where the state is losing its monopoly both on war and on social organization, worrying about another Munich is as useful as worrying about another Defenestration of Prague. The 21st-century context is radically different from the context of Europe in the 1930s.

Conservatives in particular now find ourselves confronting vast changes in the grand strategic context, changes many find emotionally difficult as well as intellectually challenging. We were brought up in a world where the grand strategic context was easy to grasp: our country, the United States of America, represented what was good, and our country's principal opponent, the Soviet Union, represented evil. "Us versus them" was a realistic and useful framework.

The new grand strategic context is much more complex, from a moral as well as a political perspective. And—here is where many conservatives choke—the United States, or at least its policy-making elites, no longer wear the white hats. Conservatives, especially cultural conservatives, face a 21st century where the landscape is dominated by two vast evil forces in collision. Sadly, one of

those forces is largely defined and led by the United States.

Of these two baleful titans, one is easy for Americans to perceive and reject. It is the conglomeration of elements collected under the big tent of Fourth Generation war, a collection that includes al-Qaeda and terrorists generally.

The Fourth Generation of Modern War, warfare since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, is the greatest change in armed conflict since the modern era began. It is marked by the state's loss of the monopoly on war it established with Westphalia and the rise of non-state elements that can fight states and win. At its core is not a military but a political, social, and moral phenomenon, a crisis of legitimacy of the state itself. All over the world, people are withdrawing their primary loyalty from the state and giving it to a wide variety of other things, of many different kinds: families, clans, tribes, ethnic groups and races, gangs, ideologies, causes such as environmentalism and animal rights, religions, and so on. Many people who would never fight for their state are willing, even eager, to fight for their new primary loyalty.

Further, just as the state was born from cannon, so Fourth Generation war is giving rise to new forms of social organization. It should not surprise us that al-Qaeda's goal is not taking power within states but abolishing the state altogether and replacing it with an *ummah* headed by a caliph, a pre-state form of social organization.

Critics of the non-state forces of the Fourth Generation say that they represent a return to the Dark Ages. That critique is valid. Where the Fourth Generation has prevailed, in places such as West Africa, Somalia, and, thanks to an American invasion, Iraq, life is once again nasty, brutish, and short. Just as the lamps went out all over Europe in 1914, so they will be extinguished, perhaps for centuries, wherever the state fails and Fourth Generation elements come to rule. This, again, is easy for Americans to grasp.

The hard and painful aspect of the new grand strategic context is that the principal opponent of the Fourth Generation is not the Christian West but Brave New World. Aldous Huxley's short novel by that title, published in the 1930s, is a chillingly accurate description of the soft totalitarianism that now sees itself within reach of unchallengeable world power.

Sadly, the march toward Brave New World is led by the United States. The main characteristics of Huxley's dystopia are all too evident in post-1960s America (and Europe). They include a culture where the summary of the law is "you must be happy," happiness coming from a combination of materialism, consumerism, electronic entertainment, and sexual pleasure; globalism, the elites' "one ring to rule them all and in the darkness bind them" under *de facto* if not *de jure* world government; and endless psychological conditioning, especially

through the government schools and the video-screen media. Religion is already relegated to the eccentric margins, at least among the elites, if not yet quite forbidden—note those elites' hysteria over the thesis of intelligent design, which can be reached via the scientific method. Even reproductive processes are becoming much as Huxley envisioned them. In

on Iraq and Afghanistan with American bayonets.

There is one element of the real Brave New World Huxley missed, and that is ideology. At the heart of the West's assault on itself, on traditional, Christian, Western culture, is the ideology of cultural Marxism, the civilizational IED planted by Gramsci, Lukacs, and the

Fourth Generation and Brave New World. They are already physically in combat in the Middle East, the Balkans, the jungles of Columbia, and the deeper jungles of Los Angeles.

What is an American who loves the country he once had, and is even more deeply devoted to the old Western culture than that country reflected, to do? Choosing the lesser of two evils is not an option because if there is one thing Brave New World and the Fourth Generation agree on it is that "Western culture's got to go." The proper answer to a choice of death by hanging or by firing squad is to refuse to participate in one's own murder.

Rather, we must do what seems impossible. We must rally the remnants of Western Christian civilization to fight Brave New World and the Fourth Generation simultaneously. Perhaps, as when the Roman Empire fell, all we will be able to accomplish is to keep the Holy Faith and (some) knowledge alive in the monasteries, whatever those may prove to be in our time. Much was then lost, but enough survived to enable the Christian West to rise again.

Yet even as Old Night comes on, there are glimmers of light. In the Third World, the advancing hordes of Islam are being met, and fought, by a growing new Christendom. That new Christendom is already strong enough to reach out into the apostate West; witness Third World Anglican bishops riding to the rescue of their oppressed orthodox coreligionists in the post-Christian Episcopal Church.

Seen from within the United States, the triumph of Brave New World appears inevitable. But here too there is hope. The globalist Brave New World elites are making what may be a fatal mistake. They think they have already won.

Whenever one party to a war believes at the outset of the conflict that his victory is inevitable, it isn't. Yet nothing more strongly characterizes Brave New World than its belief in inevitable

THE VALUES OF BRAVE NEW WORLD ARE EMBODIED IN AMERICA'S POST-1960S CULTURE TO AN ASTONISHING DEGREE, AND NOT ONLY EMBODIED BUT AGGRESSIVELY EXPORTED.

the post-Christian West, sex is predominantly recreational, and if children do not yet come from bottles, not many babies result from all that sex. Soon enough, thanks to genetic engineering, the genetic conditioning Huxley foresaw will join psychological conditioning to create an inescapable prison for the human will. At that point, we will face the Abolition of Man. No wonder Huxley's "savage," who represents the Last Man, committed suicide.

Presciently, Huxley also foresaw America's leading role in the creation of Brave New World; the calendar was measured "in the Year of Our Ford." The fact that the United States is now Brave New World's chief promoter and, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, enforcer, is not due merely to the short-term phenomenon of the neocons' hold on national policy. (Though neocons see themselves as defenders of liberty, their Newspeak definition of "freedom" is shorthand for everything Huxley feared.) Rather, the values of Brave New World are embodied in America's post-1960s culture to an astonishing degree. And not only embodied, but aggressively exported, in everything from our television programs and the Internet to the imposition of feminism and soon, no doubt, gay rights

Frankfurt School. Known most commonly as political correctness or multiculturalism, cultural Marxism holds sway over all Western elites; to deny or contravene it (without groveling apologies) is to cease instantly to be a member of the elite. It has already made vast progress toward its goals of "negation" of Western culture and the "transvaluation of all values" (stolen from Nietzsche), which means simply that the old sins become virtues and the old virtues, sins. Buggery is a fine, normal, high-principled thing, but for God's sake, don't smoke.

Just as Brave New World's critique of the forces of the Fourth Generation as representatives of a new Dark Age is valid, so is the critique of Brave New World by much of the Fourth Generation. When they say Brave New World is Satanic, they are correct. A traditional Christian theologian might dare go further than Salafi mullahs; in its efforts to create an everlasting, all-embracing, inescapable virtual reality where man loses all free will, Brave New World may be hell's most audacious attempt to expel Christ from this world altogether. In other words, Brave New World is anti-Christ.

Thus we see the grand strategic context of the 21st century, defined by the cosmic collision of the forces of the

victory. It permeates American elites' rhetoric: globalism is inevitable; liberal, secular democracy, the "end of history," is inevitable; the obliteration of Christian morals is inevitable; enslavement of the world's population to electronic virtual realities is inevitable.

Poppycock. In the real world, the forces of the Fourth Generation are already defeating those of Brave New World in one venue after another, from Gaza through Iraq to Afghanistan. History, it seems, is not quite dead. Brave New World cannot see that the forces undermining the legitimacy of the state are more powerful than most states, especially at the moral level.

The globalist economy is beginning to raise Western middle classes against itself as they perceive that it means their

extinction. In America, the governing Brave New World elite has made the classic hubristic blunder of imperial overreach, starting, then losing, avoidable wars. America's finances are precarious, its economy depends on endless foreign loans, and its Brave New lifestyle depends on a flood of energy that is drying up. It all looks ever more like Versailles in about 1788, minus Versailles's good manners and music.

When Brave New World's walls come a tumblin' down—and they will—men of the West may have their opportunity. Bewildered, shocked, sometimes panicked societies will seek alternatives but not know where to turn.

We do know where to turn. In the West, and perhaps beyond the West, survival will mean turning back, back to the

old ideas, old ways of living, old morals and old faith. They have not been gone, or almost so, for so long that they are forgotten. Our task now is to take them down off the shelves, polish them up, and fit them once again for service. When the vacuum appears, we, as cultural conservatives, can and must be ready to fill it. Whoever fills it successfully will be the winner of the war between the Fourth Generation and Brave New World.

The good news is that the victor does not have to be either of the main contenders. ■

William S. Lind is director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation in Washington, D.C.



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Armies of the Right?

Crusading for democracy is actually a left-wing disorder.

By Paul Gottfried

AN OBSERVER OF THE LEFT might conclude that one of its permanent characteristics is being against war. From European Greens to Hollywood celebrities, denouncing the military and everything associated with it has become a predictable leftist gesture. But progressives have not always been against military adventures, and most of America's 20th-century wars enjoyed at least as much support on the Left as on the Right. From Wilson's crusade for democracy to President Clinton's bombing of Christian Serbs to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Albanian Muslims, the American Left has found wars it could endorse—and even egg on.

But the Left has popularized the fiction that bellicosity comes exclusively and necessarily from the Right. Illustrative of this tendency is the propagation of books and articles since the early 1990s that attempt to produce a genealogy for neoconservatives going back to interwar German authoritarians. According to authors like Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss was both the true architect of neoconservatism and a scheming German elitist. Essential to his work was producing students who could influence the government and push their fellow citizens into imperialist wars. First Newt Gingrich and later George W. Bush became the vehicles through which the neoconservatives carried out their supposedly right-wing project.

The question left begging is why those who pursue this Straussian design talk incessantly about spreading leftist ideals. The progressives who charge

neoconservatives with being right-wing militarists cannot or will not recognize in their targets kindred spirits. Do all the publications that now back global-democratic politics belong to the same jackbooted world as the one supposedly inhabited by Strauss and his students? A look at *Foreign Affairs*, which claims to have no ideological affiliations, will reveal the opinions of Max Boot, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, and other regulars from *The Weekly Standard*. Meanwhile, such neoconservative newspapers as the *New York Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Times*, and *New York Sun*, the magazines *Commentary*, *National Review*, and *The National Interest*, and Fox News provide a glorification of America's struggle against undemocratic forces worldwide.

Whether it was Clinton's references to Wilson's crusade for democracy before the American bombing of Kosovo or Madeleine Albright asking why more use was not being made of our vast military arsenal, neoconservative policies resonate in the Democratic camp. An academic identified with the Democratic Left, Duke University professor James Barber, has a work of almost 500 pages, *The Book of Democracy*, which is full of praise for the American government's efforts to export our way of life. Barber tells American leaders, "Action is necessary now to make democracy the permanent norm of government throughout the world." Barber, of course, never rules out force on behalf of his global vision.

There can be little doubt that this new militarism belongs to the Left rather than

the Right—an inconvenient fact for those critics on the American Right who keep reaching for the term "fascism" as a description of neoconservative or Republican bellicosity. Robert Nisbet, Claes Ryn, and Tom Woods have all been closer to the mark when they accentuate the revolutionary, egalitarian character of American militarism. The reason American power is to be projected is not to test our virility nor to vindicate Christendom. From the tracts of Christopher Hitchens, Paul Berman, Charles Krauthammer, Ralph Peters, and Victor Davis Hanson, it seems that we have invaded Iraq to fight for women's rights, secularism, and democratic equality. That is certainly a different justification from the one Mussolini gave for invading Ethiopia, which was to re-establish the glory of the Roman Empire.

Nor could one easily confuse *New York Post* columnist Peters with the Japanese traditionalist and Samurai-admirer Yukio Mishima or Ernst Jünger, the German celebrant of the returning front soldiers from World War I. Such flamboyant novelists extolled manly struggle while respecting their enemies as worthy adversaries in a fatalistically conceived universe. For Peters and other neoconservative militarists, capturing the entire world for American democracy reflects the inclusiveness illustrated by our history; it is the last of the "many revolutions" in which Americans have had a hand. In his latest book, *New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy*, Peters writes about the hurdles American democracy had to surmount—racism, sexism, and other forms

of discrimination—before we evolved into fully qualified world missionaries.

There are two kinds of narratives that usually accompany left-wing militarism. One such narrative can be seen in Peters but even more dramatically in AEI resident scholar Walter Berns, who in *Making Patriots* talks about the thrill of growing up in Chicago during World War II. Berns's excitement came from the reflected glory of war but equally from the noble ideals for which American soldiers were fighting. He holds up American wars as an "educational experience" aimed at countries that have resisted democracy and equality. Wars also create democratic patriots at home, a high-minded goal that we are urged to value.

Left-wing militarists also favor a view of the past that reinforces their fixation on American "democratic" power. The Manichean struggle between democracy and its adversaries is pushed into the distant past, indeed to a point at which it has no plausible connection to present regimes. Victor Davis Hanson recently remarked that the attack on the Syracusans by the Athenians in 413 B.C. was the "last time two democracies fought each other." One must wonder on what planet Hanson resides. The two "democracies" that confront each other in Book Seven of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* are slave-holding societies in which women were virtual chattel. While Hanson rages against the Confederate civilians whom General Sherman pillaged and against the German Empire in 1914, which was a less advanced version of an English parliamentary monarchy, he proclaims ancient Greek regimes to be "democratic."

This brings up another related assumption among left-wing militarists, that democracies are essentially peaceful. If the good guys do brawl, it is because others have forced them into street fights against their nature. But once the democrats have finished with

their global mission—as Murray Rothbard used to joke by "making perpetual war for the sake of perpetual peace"—gang fights will no longer be required.

A comparison of this messianic vision to Woodrow Wilson's crusade for democracy in the First World War comes to mind. After all, Wilson helped pioneer in this country the attitudes that other left-wing militarists have now taken over. Those who fought on Wilson's side in the Great War were seen as virtuous, unlike the losers, who elicited his scorn. Arthur Link's multi-volume biography of this global crusader points out that in 1919 he instructed the directors of American humanitarian aid in Europe to help Allied countries but not to show generosity toward those who lived in nations that had fought on the other side. For Wilson, as for later left-wing militarists, it was impossible to grasp that populations had taken the Allied side in the war because of a larger alliance system or because of internal political intrigues. Their choice was supposedly dictated by inherent wickedness instead.

Similarly, Ralph Peters denies that any sizeable group in Hitler's Germany had not marched in lockstep behind Nazi tyrants. The resistance movement against Hitler appealed to "those who never lifted a finger against the Nazi regime until the Red Army closed in on their hereditary land in East Prussia." Moreover, as Peters tells us, the Germans, who have not rallied to the Bush administration in Iraq, are mostly unreconstructed Nazis. Despite our strenuous postwar preaching of democracy, "next one will hear from Berlin how the Jews planned the Holocaust all along." It doesn't matter that heavily documented studies, the most famous by a German Jewish refugee, Hans Rothfels, present a very different and totally sympathetic treatment of the German resistance, which opposed the Nazis out of principle. From Peters's left-wing militarist

perspective, Germans are unchangeably Nazi. And for Hanson, the American attack on Baghdad was not a new situation but a re-enactment of the Union's victory over Southern slaveholders.

All of human history for these authors features the same cast of good and bad guys. Thus the enemy in the Arab world is fascist, while those who lead the Islamofascists are reincarnated Hitlers. The most recent incarnation will in due course yield to another, who will also be accused of scoffing at human rights and threatening world democracy. Another war will then have to be mounted, as part of a cleansing violence that must continue until the undemocratic foe has been crushed.

This left-wing militarism may owe less to Marxism or Trotskyism in particular than to a modern form of religious dualism. Friends and enemies never vary, no matter what period of time we are made to focus on. The enemy usually speaks with a German, Southern, or Arab accent, and the heroes resemble Harry Truman or Scoop Jackson Democrats.

Most importantly, left-wing militarism's world picture has become extremely widespread in our country, particularly among journalists and politicians, and it may be alive and kicking for some time to come. This militarism thrives because it is compatible with internationalism, egalitarianism, a large welfare state, a consumer economy, and other aspects of our society in a way that right-wing militarism is not. So far the militarists who have operated here have not wrought the degree of havoc that older forms of militarism did in the past. Whether this will remain the case, if the neoconservatives continue to get their way, is an open question. ■

Paul Gottfried is a professor of humanities at Elizabethtown College and the author of The Strange Death of Marxism.

Arts & Letters

FILM

[Match Point]

Field Trip From Woody World

By Steve Sailer

NONE OF WOODY ALLEN'S three dozen movies has made more than \$40 million at the box office, and the last one to do that well was "Hannah and Her Sisters" two decades ago.

Yet Woody's reputation among film critics and Academy Award voters remains curiously exalted. His screenplay nomination for his new film "Match Point" gives him 20 directing and screenwriting Oscar nods, putting him one past Billy Wilder ("Some Like It Hot" and a host of other movies more memorable than anything Woody has done) to make him, theoretically, the greatest *auteur* ever.

In reality, Woody is more like the Pete Rose of the movies—not quite gifted enough to swing for the fences, but due to a prodigious work ethic—"Eighty percent of success is showing up," he claims—he has amassed a remarkable number of singles and the occasional double.

Lately, though, Woody has generated mostly strikeouts like last spring's "Melinda and Melinda," in which the only entertainment derived from the self-parody of casting big Will Ferrell as the Woody Allen character.

Fortunately, "Match Point," while hardly the second coming of Ingmar Bergman and Alfred Hitchcock rolled

into one, as some critics have predictably enthused, is at least an infield single. If you chance upon it on TV someday, you probably won't recognize it as a Woody Allen movie, although a little pretentious philosophizing about the meaninglessness of the universe might give it away. Both Woody and the surplus celebrities who infest most of his films are missing from it. "Match Point" is neither a comedy nor one of Woody's unwatchable pseudo-Nordic gloomathons. Instead, it's a genre flick, a competently made if surprisingly generic erotic thriller in the tradition of 1985's "The Jagged Edge," complete with that oldest cliché of the format, the adulterous tennis pro.

Yet knowing it's by Woody makes "Match Point" more likeable because it's gratifying to see a 70-year-old legend industriously climb out of the ruts he's fallen into.

For example, ever since 1979's "Manhattan," umpteen of his movies have been set in Woody World—that luminous alternate universe where New York culturati own showcase apartments, dally all afternoon in romantic tourist sites scoured of unsightly tourists, and never worry about the price of anything.

Carelessness about cost is an odd affectation for Woody's scripts, since he's famously stingy with his film's budgets and shooting schedules. Indeed, "Match Point" benefits from his having been forced to relocate to England to get tax-break assisted financing from the BBC.

Refreshingly, the film is explicitly about the cost of living in the London version of Woody World. A journeyman Irish tennis player with more cultivated preferences than he can afford (a rather unsympathetic Jonathan Rhys-Meyers)

takes a poorly paid teaching job at a posh London club and moves into a tiny but dismayingly expensive flat.

One day, the pro mentions his love of opera to a rich student, played by newcomer Matthew Goode, who can elevate his eyebrows in the beguiling manner of William F. Buckley. The young toff invites his tennis teacher to Covent Garden to meet the family, who turn out to be swell swells, Woody's ideal of the polite WASP family that has always fascinated and troubled him. The sweet, cheerful sister (Emily Mortimer) can't take her eyes off the brooding yet well-spoken athlete. Soon they are an item and her benevolent father, the founder of a securities firm in the City, puts his future son-in-law on the fast track to the executive suite.

Then, however, the social climber meets his brother-in-law's sultry fiancée, an untalented American actress (Scarlett Johansson) from a family of beautiful losers. Trouble slowly brews, finally unleashing several swift, well-plotted reversals of fortune.

Although "Match Point" is supposedly set in the present, Woody barely deigns to notice Tony Blair's vulgarized, multi-cultural, tabloid-dominated Cool Britannia. For this son of 1950s Brooklyn, there'll always be an England where the upper class sets the proper tone of cultural refinement and well-bred charm. The lack of satire in his portrayal of the kindly upper-crust family and their stuffy but civilized milieu is telling. Like Ralph Lauren, Woody Allen is one of the few surviving pop cultural figures whose old-fashioned tastes gelled before the *faux* egalitarianism and resentful identity politics of the 1960s undermined the reign of the traditional elegance of the old Anglo-American Protestant elite. ■

Rated R for some sexuality.

BOOKS

[*Winning the Race: Beyond the Crisis in Black America*, John McWhorter, Gotham Books, 434 pages]

Alienation as Self-Medication

By Elizabeth Wright

JOHN MCWHORTER THINKS he has hit upon the reason so many blacks continue to respond to today's America with an alienation that is "disconnected from current reality." Why is it that earlier generations of blacks, whose lives were bounded by racial restrictions unknown to the present generation, managed to avoid falling into traps that led to abandonment of families in massive numbers and adoption of violent and self-destructive lifestyles?

Readers will recognize some of McWhorter's themes from his previous books. Now, in *Winning the Race*, he targets the conventional wisdom that roots today's black pathology primarily in past economic tribulations. For McWhorter, the roots are decidedly grounded in culture. This approach to the subject is not entirely unique and has been handled by other authors, most notably by Shelby Steele. McWhorter, however, strives to expand on why social deterioration occurred as it did.

By using as his model the black district of Indianapolis from the early years of the 20th century, he determines to debunk the theory that poor black communities came undone in the mid-1960s due to the loss of manufacturing jobs, the emigration of the black middle class to suburbia, and the impact of drugs. No, McWhorter claims, something much more powerful than deindustrialization and middle-class flight turned the black poor against themselves. That something was born in the 1960s, "when black America met the New Left."

White liberals succeeded in getting government agencies and academic progressives to turn their attention to the plight of the black poor. The social and economic policies that resulted from this new benevolence irrevocably changed the culture of black neighborhoods. The creation of an "open-ended" form of government welfare that had never been known before proved disastrous.

In Indianapolis and across the U.S., welfare was not only free and easy to get but was vigorously encouraged by whites who viewed these gifts from the Treasury as a form of justice. The expansion of this new kind of welfare was specifically directed to blacks, says McWhorter, and it soon took its toll.

Another result of this encounter with the country's radical liberals was the adoption of the counterculture disseminated by them. Blacks across class lines began to reject mainstream norms. In earlier times, writes McWhorter, alienation felt by blacks was often a spur to action, an incentive to roll up their sleeves. But now their alienation became a form of self-medication—a "therapeutic alienation," something to be indulged, not overcome.

Multitudes of blacks began to fetishize the "evils of the White Man," a preoccupation that became a crutch for what McWhorter calls a "spiritual deficit." Liberal whites, in their desire to have allies in the crusade to undermine The System, fed this growing discontent. As blacks idled on the dole, claims McWhorter, the activists were unperturbed because "their actions were really about them, not justice or compassion."

As in prior works, McWhorter does a good job of bringing to life the "world-within-a-world" that was the early black enclave in segregated America. In Indianapolis, as in Chicago and other places, in spite of societal racism, blacks carved out tolerable lives for themselves, and the general spirit among them, says McWhorter, was that of "a glass half full, not half empty." In Indianapolis, a city where in the 1920s the Ku Klux Klan boasted 40 percent of the white male population as members, including the

mayor and other officials, black students overflowed Crispus Attucks High School, while those who had to work during the day attended night school.

The black business district along Indiana Avenue was host to stores, restaurants, and other small businesses, as well as black-owned newspapers with national circulations. In the white-owned factories, blacks had the lowest-paying jobs and were rarely promoted to positions as craftsmen, yet in spite of overt discrimination, McWhorter points out that wherever they lived, "black people took the jobs that were available." In 1940, 90 percent of blacks in Indianapolis were employed, and men who became fathers were expected to live with the mothers of their children.

Did this reasonably stable community life come to a screeching halt by the mid-1960s for the reasons offered by sociologist William Julius Wilson and others, who claim that the poorer classes entered a downturn when factories moved away from urban areas and the black middle class fled once the gates of integration were opened?

Or is McWhorter right that the demise of such enclaves was due to a new mindset ushered in by whites who were more concerned about bringing down the scorned establishment than with the genuine needs of the people whose cause they had supposedly taken up?

How well I remember such whites. At the time, New York City seemed to be filled with no other kind. The decade of the 1970s is recalled as one endless, futile rant with people who found an excuse to exonerate blacks from all forms of personal responsibility. I remember an especially terse encounter over an issue highlighted by McWhorter. He writes about the "massive high-rise public housing projects," which liberals came to denounce for what they considered inappropriate architectural design for the poor, who supposedly were coming from neighborhoods of close communities. Activists railed against these structures of "inhuman scale," and contributed to the decisions by some cities to demolish them.

The truth is that housing officials decided to raze them because the buildings had not been conceived with crime control in mind. As crime escalated within these developments, their concealed stairwells and entrances made it difficult for decent residents to escape the dastardly ploys of criminals.

In my conversation with Miss White Liberal, a 30-ish academic committed to the cause of Black Liberation, I expressed shock over a news item that a housing project in some American city, built only in the 1950s, was to be torn down in this, the 1970s. This was to be my first exposure to the inhuman scale argument that this good liberal insisted made understandable the ensuing anti-social behavior and criminal activities that ruled in most housing projects.

I asked if she had seen the photos in a recent *New York Times* article of truly poor people in Calcutta, who were living outdoors under pieces of oilcloth and cardboard. Did she not think that those people would give anything to take up residency in such buildings? Imagine what it would mean to have roofs over their heads and indoor plumbing. They might not turn the place into a paradise, I conceded, but I bet there would be no whining about buildings that lacked a sense of community, nor would there be any urinating in the elevators.

The good liberal lady spluttered and fulminated over my heretical declarations. Such whites thought nothing of dressing down blacks who took exception to their more deplorable and illogical notions of what constituted social justice. And a dissenter risked a verbal flogging for daring to suggest that some of the new policies that were being fortified as law just might interfere with the constitutional rights of whites.

Throughout the book, McWhorter continues his argument over what played the greatest part in the demise of black neighborhoods in the 1960s, claiming that the poor were “done in by white society’s misguided brand of benevolence.” As to the middle class, like most black professionals, McWhorter is protective of the group and insists that its

exit from black enclaves in the 1960s played no role in the ensuing deterioration. These were the people whose behavior, moral standards, and attitudes towards thrift became models for emulation—the class to which the poor aspired to rise. McWhorter sings the praises of this bourgeoisie who, during segregation, were the creators of businesses and providers of employment, along with being founders and sustainers of charitable institutions, all of which disappeared with them.

This class of blacks is best described in Allen Spear’s book *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto*, where we see prominent leaders purposely discouraging blacks from creating institutions of their own. These elites feared that too many successful ventures under black auspices would send the signal that blacks did not, after all, crave integration with whites. Once it was clear to members of this class that the coercive power of government could be used in their behalf, they were eager to ride the wave of forced integration and abandon their home communities.

McWhorter singles out the militant elites and the disruptive roles they played throughout the campaign for civil rights. However, I recall not just those militants but members of the respectable black establishment as well, often represented by the NAACP, not so subtly intimating the possibility of “long, hot summers” if particular demands were not met. Members of both elites, the “official” middle class leaders and the posturing militants, often played off one another as they strove to keep whitey on edge and pliable to demands. Always in the air was the possibility of riot and social chaos.

McWhorter asks why Julian Bond’s NAACP busies itself today with trivia such as castigating some clueless white person for his misplaced words, while ignoring real internal crises among blacks. He answers his own question: “Because Bond is under the influence of a meme born in the sixties that elevates the thrill of shaking a fist at whitey, so seductive that it can distract one from less thrilling but more urgent work that actu-

ally improves people’s daily existences.” A cynic might suggest that Bond works the victimology game only because successful fundraising drives can be built around the depiction of ongoing suffering of a downtrodden people at the hands of a hopelessly racist society.

In a surprising discourse, McWhorter exhorts readers to drop the bashing of people who have come to be called “poverty pimps.” He does not like this term. It seems that we’ve all been mistaken, and there are no black leaders who are out to “line their pockets.” Leaders who have become prominent through their promotion of the victim mentality among the masses are not “callow charlatans” but are simply “processing black America through a psychological lens that assuages an inner hurt.”

He had me wondering if he believes that these black leaders bear no responsibility for helping to inculcate and nurture the very alienation that he writes about. They might have misled the masses, he implies, but only because they, too, are caught in that same “therapeutic alienation.” In this light, Jesse Jackson, who a great many people believe has extorted enough millions out of corporations and the government to transform several black ghettos, is simply caught up in the same tide as his brothers. Ditto for Al Sharpton, Louis Farrakhan, and the many wannabes who are found in almost every black community.

In *A Dream Deferred*, Shelby Steele says that the leaders of a mass movement must keep adding fresh grievances to the original complaint. “It is their vocation now, and their means to status and power.” That perfectly describes so much black leadership since the 1960s, and it sounds like pimping to me.

Winning the Race is not as tightly argued by McWhorter as *Losing the Race* or *Authentically Black* and, when he is not making a relevant point, the book often drifts off into personal memoir or arcane psychological analyses. It is twice as long as it needs to be. ■

Elizabeth Wright is the editor of Issues and Views.

[*The Cold War: A New History*, John Lewis Gaddis, Penguin, 400 pages]

Still Fighting the Last War

By William Anthony Hay

THE COLD WAR defined international politics from 1945 to 1989 and profoundly shaped the outlook of two generations. As James Mann shows in *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, Cold War tensions provided the formative experience for those making American foreign policy today. Even if the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union has passed from current events into history, its story gives some insight into current preoccupations.

Understanding the Cold War, however, involves piercing a thicket of preconceptions and plowing through a dense literature that accumulated from an early stage. John Lewis Gaddis points to the difficulties of describing an event from within: work written during the conflict often had a polemical edge that reflected ideological presuppositions. Information hidden in Soviet bloc archives before the 1990s, along with declassified material from Western governments, has changed how scholars view the protracted standoff between capitalist West and communist East. Gaddis has taken the lead in reassessing the struggle with books including *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*.

The Cold War: A New History reflects Gaddis's experience teaching Yale undergraduates with no direct experience of the conflict. Requests for a concise overview that explained why a struggle that threatened to bring Armageddon ended with a whimper rather than a bang led him to synthesize earlier work into a book for the general reader. Unfortunately, the book itself lacks the drama Gaddis attributes to the Cold War. Gaddis often skips over the

complexity of particular episodes to sustain the narrative and falls back on clichés in discussing other periods outside his expertise. Despite the book's brevity, its flagging pace after a few chapters suggests a lack of enthusiasm by the author that readers cannot help but share. If Gaddis provides an adequate introduction for newcomers, readers seeking depth, nuance, and interpretation might look elsewhere.

Although Gaddis's view of the Cold War as the product of Soviet aggression would strike most readers as unremarkable, setting it beside other literature gives a very different picture. Revisionists in the 1970s and '80s such as Gar Alperowitz and Lloyd Gardiner either divided blame between the antagonists or saw the United States as being more at fault. Their interpretation reflected the assumptions of the Vietnam-era New Left, with its emphasis on the inherently expansionist nature of capitalism and its implications for American foreign policy. Work along such lines by William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFaber may have lacked the taint of archival scholarship, relying instead on theory backed by facts cribbed from secondary work, but it carried weight within the academy.

Richard Pipes and Robert Conquest demonstrated beyond doubt that Ronald Reagan had the Soviet Union to rights when he called it an evil empire. Conquest indeed joked after the Cold War about entitling an updated edition of his work *I Told You So*. The Soviet regime's nature does not, however, give a complete picture of Cold War diplomacy. Drawing on documents from Soviet archives, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov argue plausibly that Soviet policy represented a combination of older Tsarist Russian objectives and Marxist expansionism. While undeniably brutal, the Stalin regime approached foreign policy far more cautiously than its Nazi counterpart.

Analyzing the outbreak from a realist perspective based on broad research in American and foreign archives, Marc Trachtenberg makes a solid case in *A Constructed Peace* for the view that both

Washington and Moscow sought hegemony after World War II and their maneuverings involved competition among states rather than the ideologically charged system of the 1930s and World War II. Anglo-American rivalry, a story rarely told by American authors, made Stalin's expectation of conflict within the West less absurd than Gaddis credits.

Gaddis dismisses revisionism without embracing Trachtenberg's realist assumptions. He casts the Cold War as a struggle between communism and democracy rather than a story of power politics. Gaddis has a Wilsonian commitment to democratization paralleling that of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, along with Cold War liberals of the Truman and Kennedy eras. Indeed, it reflects the views of his predominantly American sources, which give a narrow perspective on events. Material in British, French, and German archives, along with Russian and Chinese sources gradually becoming available, gives a much more sophisticated picture. Gaddis would have done well to reach beyond what Sally Marks aptly described in the journal *Diplomatic History* as the view from Washington shaped by reliance on State Department cables and other official documents.

Despite the bipolar system formed by superpower rivalry, other states remained important and often problematic for their allies. Anti-colonial movements showed how the weak could challenge the strong, and smaller powers exerted considerable autonomy. Nonaligned states in the Third World pushed the superpowers to bid against each other for support by threatening to co-operate with one side against the other. Aid became a diplomatic tool whose value seems in retrospect more apparent than real. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt proved especially adept, showing other leaders how to turn Cold War tensions to their advantage.

Relations among leading states within the two blocs were also more nuanced than the superpower model would suggest: Mao resisted Soviet leadership over the Communist bloc, while Charles de

Gaulle charted France's separate path in the West. Smaller allies often tried to draw larger patrons into conflicts for their own ends. Taiwan threatened to bring the United States into a clash with China during the 1950s, and Gaddis argues that even satellite regimes in Eastern Europe such as East Germany under Walter Ulbricht took steps that forced Nikita Khrushchev into constructing the Berlin Wall. While rejecting moral equivalence, Gaddis highlights parallels between the two superpowers and stresses the complexity of the Cold War international system. The Soviets played off rivalry in the West with unsuccessful efforts to split NATO either by appealing to Washington over its allies or by cutting a separate deal in Europe to exclude the United States.

Containment worked in Europe, but Vietnam drew the United States into a costly war that Nixon liquidated by deftly aligning with China. Geopolitics mattered more than ideology. Mao told his astonished personal doctor Li Zhisui in 1969, "I like to deal with rightists. They say what they really think—not like the leftists, who say one thing and mean another."

CONTAINMENT THROUGH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WORKED, BUT VIETNAM SHOWED THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALIENATING DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION WITH OVERSTRETCH.

Reagan pushed the Soviets on the defensive, and they adroitly shifted to reduce tensions. Gaddis describes a little-known incident in 1983 that almost sparked a crisis when the Soviets briefly convinced themselves that a NATO military exercise presaged an attack. By January 1984, Reagan had begun public overtures that led to renewed arms control negotiations. Gaddis writes that Reagan never sought to overthrow the Soviet Union, but simply to win the Cold War.

In hindsight, the Soviet Union seemed far stronger than it actually was. Under Leonid Brezhnev the system began rotting from within, and only Western ineptitude and the impact of economic stagnation during the 1970s created the

appearance of strength. Efforts by Mikhail Gorbachev to reform the system brought collapse: Gaddis points out that while Reagan and Margaret Thatcher had clear objectives, Gorbachev had only tactics for meeting challenges of the day. A bitter irony came when the bicentennial of the French Revolution that communists celebrated as the forerunner to their own movement saw popular opinion across Eastern Europe categorically reject the Soviet order. Not only the Cold War international system but the Soviet Union itself came to an abrupt and relatively peaceful end by 1991. The rapid change left policy makers and analysts adrift in a new world they had not anticipated.

Readers cannot help asking about lessons to be drawn for the present. A few general lessons can be teased out. Effective policy must reconcile ends with means to be sustainable. Containment through the Atlantic alliance worked, but Vietnam showed the consequences of alienating domestic public opinion with overstretch. The persistent American habit of seeking easy answers either with tough rhetoric without force behind it or ignoring threats in the hope

they will pass always brings disappointment. Working through alliances to leverage power may be a rough path but is still a better one than militant unilateralism that risks isolation. Exploiting divisions among adversaries as Nixon did with China and the Soviet Union also served American interests well, and thoughtful analysts have offered it as a model for engaging militant Islam.

Cold War struggles may provide perspective on how those shaped by them respond to crises today, but they offer limited guidance on how the world now operates. Dominic Lieven sensed the new patterns during the Soviet Union's final days, when he saw that his expertise as an historian of imperial Russia

afforded him better insights on developments in the dying superpower than those available to Soviet specialists trained in social science. The experience of living through events in Russia led him to write a revealing comparative history of empires.

Others proved slower to understand the change. Predictions of a balancing coalition against the United States by other powers or the rise of a new peer competitor proved as illusory as those of an end to history brought about by the triumph of democracy. In responding to Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, American leaders fit very different situations into the Cold War framework of ideological confrontation. Petty tyrants with regional ambitions took on an importance beyond their merits.

Current issues have more in common with the pre-1914 era than with superpower rivalry during the anomalous period Gaddis describes. Core and periphery mark a sharper dichotomy than East and West, particularly as many regions beyond the developed world fall back into chaos. Events like the Suez crisis or Algerian War take on a different cast from today's perspective. Globalization conquered the tyranny of distance at the same time that advanced societies became less able to impose their will on other regions. While Edward Gibbon claimed two hundred years ago that Europe and its offshoots beyond the oceans had become invulnerable to outside threats, military and cultural superiority no longer make the West immune to events beyond its shores.

A more fluid international system requires foresight more than crisis management. Perhaps the greatest lesson for today from the Cold War lies in how close on some occasions the wrong choices came to bringing catastrophe. If the margin for error seems wide in the absence of a current superpower rival, recklessness over time still carries considerable risks. ■

William Anthony Hay, an historian at Mississippi State University, is the author of The Whig Revival, 1808-1830.

[*The Virtuoso Conductors: The Central European Tradition from Wagner to Karajan*, Raymond Holden, Yale University Press, 384 pages]

Authoritarian Personalities

By R.J. Stove

"Show me an orchestra that likes its conductor and I'll show you a lousy conductor."

—Goddard Lieberman (1911-1977), American recording producer

When the late *New York Times* critic Harold Schonberg started preparing his much admired 1967 book *The Great Conductors*, he found that up-to-date literature on the topic hardly existed in English. Even now, the field attracts far less research than one might suppose. We can ascribe part of this neglect to the subject's irksomeness for unreconstructed Marxist deadheads. After all, great conductors are an innately authoritarian breed, never more so than when purporting to be mystical dreamers or backslapping democrats.

This fact aggravates the difficulties of pressing them into the service of undergraduate fetishes like "history from below." It also leaves the field wide open for tabloid gossips, tireless in churning out reams of lubricious pseudo-scholarship about whichever maestro they despise most. If the maestro has left caches of idiotically imprudent correspondence, all the better.

Raymond Holden, himself a conductor of note, teaches at London's Royal Academy of Music. This is a case where a book's subtitle reveals much more than its title: Holden's concern lies with specifically Austro-German musicians. Seven of Holden's subjects are familiar to every musical literate: Wagner, Mahler, Richard Strauss, Otto Klemperer, Bruno Walter, Wilhelm Furtwängler, and Herbert von Karajan. The other

three remain known primarily to music historians: Hans von Bülow (1830-1894), Liszt's son-in-law and Cosima Wagner's first husband; Arthur Nikisch (1855-1922); and Felix Weingartner (1863-1942). To his credit, Holden avoids all prurience; he also knows performing history backwards, upside-down, and inside out, so that *The Virtuoso Conductors* plugs a regrettable gap.

Unfortunately, too much of its prose is simply dull, and though it greatly surpasses Schonberg's *tour d'horizon* in its fine detail and scholarly apparatus, it cannot match Schonberg's verve or character delineation. Moreover, sometimes Holden furnishes opinions without ancillary factual evidence, as in his implied reproach of conductors outside his chosen geographical area: "Unlike the Italian, Russian, British and American schools [of conducting]," Holden writes, "that of Central Europe grew out of the music itself." Yet did not the entire outlook of Toscanini, for example, both lauded and denounced for his textual rigorism, grow out of the music itself? Were Russian, British, and American conductors pushing some non-musical agenda? If so, what? We are not told.

Poor copy editing periodically trips Holden up, with an incorrect date for Walter's death (he died in 1962, not 1961), and with crucial words or syllables elided: Walter seeks to "adopt some of hero's podium gestures," while Strauss "had not been a particular [sic] effective third conductor." And must we really be informed afresh in every single chapter that "Don Giovanni" is by Mozart, or the "Eroica" Symphony is by Beethoven?

At least Holden perceives Wagner's revolutionary importance on the rostrum, as elsewhere. Before Wagner, the German-speaking lands' most eminent conductors had been Weber, Mendelssohn, and Louis Spohr. For all three artists, conducting was merely what they did when not playing music or writing it. Spohr's violinistic brilliance attracted comparison with Paganini's; Weber and Mendelssohn ranked with the greatest 19th-century pianists, Mendelssohn being in addition a leading

organist. Wagner, by contrast, lacked any marketable aptitude as instrumentalist to fall back on. Thus, for him, the baton constituted not a toy but a way of life. There is a good reason why, in composing the climax to *Tannhäuser*, he made the protagonist's staff burst symbolically into flower.

Prototypical also was Wagner's itinerant apprenticeship in small opera houses, those training camps for subsequent Central European conductors until almost yesterday. Such men gained their expertise in opera first and in purely orchestral events second, if at all. Monarchical Germany's abundance of miniature sovereign states assisted music-making no end. The Teutonic conducting tradition showed itself as hospitable as any Habsburg emperor towards outsiders of talent; witness Mahler, born in what is now the Czech Republic; Nikisch from Hungary; and Weingartner from Croatia.

Bülow held the dubious distinction of being the first internationally respected conductor who never achieved any stature as a composer. This whetted his tyranny, as artless and uncalculating a phenomenon as that of Ivan the Terrible, whom in facial terms Bülow somewhat resembled. A Cologne newspaper, conceding Bülow's musical mastery, griped, "Alas, this man does not only perform; he also talks." At times even his formidable command of verbal abuse failed to convey his meaning; confronted with one negligible composer who sought a verdict on a piece he had written, Bülow expressively vomited. Withal, he drove himself 50 times harder than he drove others. In 1876 he recklessly committed himself to give 172 American concerts; he fell so sick that he could manage only 33, and lost a fortune through breaching his contract.

So magnificent a pianist as to make Liszt himself sit up, Bülow had not a selfish or manipulative corpuscle in his whole body. The contrast with Mahler—pianistically insignificant and engaged in a perpetual moondance of Mahler-worship—is obvious, however notable the resemblances between both conductors' vituperative rehearsal methods.

Holden emphasizes a fact that Mahlerian hagiographers studiously suppress: Mahler's mania for rewriting every Mozart opera he conducted, in the apparent belief that Wolfgang Amadeus had nothing to teach him about composition. Naturally, Viennese who lamented such high-handedness were, in Mahler's own word, "rabble."

Nikisch preferred persuading orchestral members to bullying them; players welcomed his presence, less because of his musicality than because he kept rehearsals short. Whereas Bülow and Mahler died too soon to leave phonographic evidence of their musical leadership, Nikisch occasionally entered recording studios. The results can please only the ear of faith, ruined as they are by pre-1914 sound quality, which singers and the piano could survive, but which made any orchestra seem like a vaudeville band underneath a blanket.

Weingartner—benefiting from the 1920s' quite spectacular technological improvements—left numerous discs, engineered vividly enough to make perfect musical sense. This alone would justify Weingartner's reputation as the first "modern" conductor; so did his podium style, as crisp and classical as Wagner's, on his own account, was improvisatory and apocalyptic. Crisp and classical by contemporaries' standards, that is, not by ours. Weingartner permitted his string-players to slide between notes in a manner foreign-sounding nowadays, but wholly conventional before World War II.

If Weingartner and Walter evoked Nikisch in their musicianship's unforced humanity, Strauss harked back to Wagner's precursors, in that he treated conducting as rather a sideline. Bülow called Strauss "Richard III," maintaining that after "Richard I"—Wagner—there could be no second. Holden speaks highly of Strauss the recording artist: more highly than do most hearers of Strauss's records. When tackling Mozart or Beethoven, "Richard III" allowed gross orchestral indiscipline, not to mention frenetic speeds that suggested simple eagerness to take the money and

run. He polished off Mozart's Symphony No. 40 in fewer than 22 minutes. While he did much better in his own music, even there he could display remarkable slackness, entrusting the first two sides of his 1917 "Don Juan" recording to his precocious assistant, George Szell.

Like other Strauss scholars—as opposed to politically correct mass-media girly-boys—Holden acquits Strauss of Nazi predilections. He observes with commendable understatement, "the hostile stance of some commentators seems difficult to justify." Holden exhibits an equally judicious approach to the wild, bardic Furtwängler, who stayed—as did Strauss—in Germany during the Third Reich.

In Furtwängler's case, this abode may have had some vague connection with the government's confiscating of his passport. Exonerated by a postwar denazification tribunal, Furtwängler accepted a 1948 offer of the Chicago Symphony's permanent conductorship, only to find that though the U.S. Army might have cleared him, the New Class had not. A rent-a-mob campaign to keep him out of the States anticipated, in every detail, our own era's Foxman-led strategies against "The Passion of the Christ." Permanent honor belongs to those Jewish artists who condemned the anti-Furtwängler hysterics; they included Walter—genuinely grieved by his long-time rival's humiliation—and Yehudi Menuhin.

In 1955, the year after Furtwängler's death, Karajan and the Berlin Philharmonic visited America: whereupon marching picketers waved banners adorned with musicologically cerebral slogans like "Tonight at Carnegie Hall The Musical Dictators of the Nazi Régime." Karajan, admittedly, had a NSDAP membership card—as an ambitious 25-year-old in 1933, he could hardly have held prestigious musical posts without one—but his decision to marry a half-Jewish lady, in 1942 at that, suggests a certain subversive streak.

Klemperer, for his part, fled Germany once Hitler took power. Still, as early as 1946—not having a Podhoretz around to teach him that all Teutons are Nazis—he

actually returned for a while to German soil. He strove, as he put it, "to heal the wounds." This was by no means the least quixotic episode in a career that began in 1906, ended only in 1971, included being thrashed on stage with a riding-crop by a jealous husband, and transcended not only bouts of manic-depression but a *Lucky Jim*-type incident in which he accidentally set alight his own bedclothes.

Nevertheless, he once met his match at a New York Philharmonic rehearsal. Accounts vary as to whether he was chastising a specific player or merely delivering a monologue on metaphysics. Anyway, the Italian-born principal oboist Bruno Labate interrupted Klemperer in mid-sentence by shouting: "Klemp, ya talka too much!"

They don't make them like that any more; nor like Karajan, who well before his 30th birthday seems to have directed every opera of the slightest renown. Karajan's death in 1989 really did mark, in a sense altogether different to Fukuyama's, "the end of history." Most younger conductors, whatever their national origin, have been a consistently humdrum lot: *Kapellmeisterisch*, to use the German pejorative. A particularly depressing syndrome is that of those Central Europeans—Christoph von Dohnányi, Kurt Masur, and Wolfgang Sawallisch are three instances—who do exciting work with Austro-German ensembles, obtain green cards for America, and there sink into directorial torpor. Probably our established musical leaders are third-rate for the same reasons that our established political leaders are third-rate: moral funk, a soul-destroying addiction to consensus, and hallucinogenic egalitarianism. When those old enough to have heard all the 20th century's indisputable conducting giants in live performance are all dead—and they soon will be—then, to quote Holden's justly cheerless words, "Western art music will have lost one of its greatest treasures." ■

R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia.

The Deuce's Detroit



Henry Ford famously said that “history is bunk,” but if the news coming out of Detroit these days is any indication, Motor City U.S.A. will soon be

history. GM lost \$8.6 billion last year, the largest loss since 1992, when the company went down for \$23.5 billion, and Ford is doing just as badly. The latter announced it would close 14 factories over the next six years and eliminate 30,000 jobs. An industry analyst called it “a sad story of two armies in retreat, a retreat that is feeling more and more like a rout.” Just as well old Henry isn’t around to see his company on the brink.

The Henry Ford I knew was the founder’s grandson, Henry Ford II, or the “Deuce,” as some of his cronies called him. I met him when I was quite young, when I occasionally dated his two daughters, Charlotte and Anne. Back then, Ford was referred to as America’s number one capitalist. He was quite friendly and pleasant, but once he had a drink in him he would turn loud and become obnoxious. Back in 1963-64, he was married to Anne McDonnell, the mother of his three children, a well-bred lady and a devout Catholic. Although based in Detroit, Ford traveled a lot and let his hair down when abroad, especially in Europe.

In the fateful summer of 1964, the Deuce arrived on the French Riviera on board his new boat, a gin palace by the name of *Santa Maria*. As they used to say in Brooklyn, he shoulda stood in bed. The uncrowned king of the Riviera back then was Gianni Agnelli the Fiat supremo, who sort of took Henry under his wing and showed him the wicked ways of European high living. Although Gianni was very much married—and remained married to the same woman until his death two years ago—he had a string of mistresses to go along with his

boats, houses, and private airplanes. Agnelli played hard and gambled even harder, and it soon became obvious that Mr. Agnelli’s lifestyle was having a very bad effect on Mr. Ford’s puritan ethic.

The following winter saw the Deuce divorce his wife, marry an Italian woman of dubious provenance, and proceed on an unending string of parties and trips. I had a falling out with him soon after because of the crude way he spoke to a woman one night in a club. But truth be told, Henry the Deuce was a hell of a businessman.

I ONCE TRIED TO FOLLOW HIM **GOING ALL OUT AT 4 A.M. IN MONTE CARLO** WITH MY MORE POWERFUL MACHINE BUT **COULD NOT OVERTAKE HIS ROAD-HUGGING CORTINA.**

For starters, he noticed the way we Europeans zipped in and out of chaotic traffic with our tiny cars, and I remember how proud he was of the first Ford Cortina his company produced. In fact, I once tried to follow him going all out at 4 a.m. in Monte Carlo with my more powerful machine but could not overtake his road-hugging Cortina. He also went to Le Mans, watched European cars do their winning stuff, and vowed to win with an American car and driver. If memory serves, Fords won with Carroll Shelby at the wheel soon after.

What I’m driving at is simple. Ford may have lacked social graces among us sophisticated Euros, but he had smarts where cars were concerned. Unlike those at the helm in Detroit today, Henry the Deuce knew how to build a winner. The buck stopped with the Deuce, and the Deuce delivered what people wanted

before the people knew it. Towards the end of his life, Ford divorced the Italian and married a nice working-class girl from Detroit, who became his widow and now lives in a spectacular house in Palm Beach. I believe his son Edsel is involved with the company, and I sometimes run into his two daughters who both live in New York. I don’t have any fond memories of him, except for the good cars he built for awhile, cars that were built by engineers, not marketing executives.

Restructuring and job cuts are sound bites, not sound business. If Detroit wants to survive it has to do something very simple. It has to produce better quality cars. Eliminating jobs won’t help build cars. If it did, Toyota, Nissan,

Honda, and others wouldn’t be building factories in Texas, Alabama, and Ohio. Sure, American car makers are shutting down factories because of high pension costs, but whose fault is that? Cowardly executives refused to face the problem for decades and now have been hit by a double whammy: bad cars and enormous pensions.

If the old Deuce were around, I’m sure he’d see that what he should be offering the American people are more cars that can run on fuels other than gasoline—fewer gas-guzzling SUVs for Hollywood types who like to act tough behind the wheel and better designed small cars that don’t fall apart at the first speed bump. You may have been a slob, Henry, but you knew a good car when you saw one, and that’s more than I can say for those who are building the Titanic cars of today. ■

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“We purchased *How to Fight Cancer & Win*, and immediately my husband started following the recommended diet for his just diagnosed colon cancer. He refused the surgery that our doctors advised. Since following the regime recommended in the book he has had no problems at all, cancer-wise. If not cured, we believe the cancer has to be in remission.”

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